Superannuation Bill

Lords amendment 1 requires the Government to consult with the aim of seeking agreement, and provides for a report to Parliament in due course. Lords amendments 2 and 3 will bring the Bill into force two months after Royal Assent and I find it extraordinary that the Government see that as some form of concession, because the bulk of the staff who will be made redundant in the coming period will be made redundant under a scheme that is still to be imposed. The Government intend that that scheme will be introduced within the two months after Royal Assent, so there will be no report to Parliament, no commitment to consultation and no commitment to take steps to reach agreement, as is embedded in Lords amendment 1. The terms of the scheme, as they stand in the original proposals in the Bill, will be imposed. So although Lords amendment 1 proposes a system whereby there is at least some commitment to parliamentary scrutiny of the willingness and commitment of the Government to negotiate and seek an agreed settlement, Lords amendments 2 and 3 take away that commitment, because we know that the scheme will be amended within the two months to which Lords amendment 1 does not apply. I cannot think of a better mechanism to incite industrial action. It could be construed as an act of contorted bad faith. Although there have been commitments in ministerial written statements, there has been no commitment to adhere to Lords amendment 1, because it would not otherwise be virtually vetoed by Lords amendments 2 and 3. In my view, that will not only result in industrial relations deteriorating but enhance the potential for legal challenges. It certainly will not enhance the legal protections for which the Government were hoping as a result of the amendments. The amendments do not address the problematic core of the Bill, which is the imposition of caps and limits on the compensation scheme without the agreement of the unions representing the members affected. I have heard a lot about the four out of the six unions agreeing or recommending the scheme that is being imposed. I remind the House, however, that of the two main unions that represent the vast bulk—more than 75%—of the members affected, one, PCS, or the Public and Commercial Services Union, has not agreed the scheme and is recommending that its members reject it in the ballot, and the executive of the other, the POA, has recommended that its members reject the scheme in the ballot, too. I find it an absolute irony that in any future negotiations, which will, I suppose, probably be relatively minor because the Government will impose the bulk of the change in the next couple of months, the House will have some form of scrutiny of the negotiations as a result of Lords amendment 1, but that it will not be able to exercise it in those two months. The reason for that is that if there was a full exposure of what went on in the negotiations, it would provoke even more anger among PCS and POA members. This has been the worst example of industrial relations practice that we have seen in years. First, there was the use of a ““blunt instrument””—I use the Government's own words—of the threat of a Bill's being brought forward to impose such severe caps that many would have lost more than two thirds of the redundancy payments that they had acquired as accrued rights over the years. There was then an extremely crude attempt to divide and rule the unions. I believe that the POA is seeking some form of legal redress against the Minister for the Cabinet Office for some of his statements. Those practices have now resulted in the virtual chaotic breakdown of the formal negotiating structures that have held good under past Governments throughout the decades. If Lords amendment 1 comes into force, at least there will be some reflection of the negotiations that took place—and it might be more accurate. As the Minister has dwelt on the process of the negotiations, perhaps I might put on the record an alternative historical account of what occurred. Yes, the civil service unions—all six of them—sought to negotiate some form of agreed settlement throughout the summer. They did that in the light of the threat of the imposition of a Bill that would cut significantly their members' redundancy payments. In September, the Treasury intervened to insist on a cash cap on the new scheme, so there was no room to manoeuvre to improve the scheme beyond that cap. I believe that that significantly undermined the potential for a settlement. On 28 September, the Minister declared that he was pursuing agreement with five of the unions, excluding the PCS, and on 4 October a formal offer was submitted. On 11 October, PCS and the POA held a constructive meeting with the Minister, focusing on the cap on redundancy proposals and making proposals to redistribute from high earners to the vast majority of civil servants, enhancing the protection for the majority.