Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

I am grateful, Miss Begg. The hon. Gentleman is missing the point. He says that the Government can continue in office only if they retain the confidence of the House. I will not dwell on this at length, Miss Begg, because that would be to move on to arguments that we will make when we come to clause 2. The Bill contains provisions whereby we will have a fixed-term Parliament, but subject to two conditions: first, this House will, for the first time, have the power to cause an early general election; and secondly, we are keeping the provision that a Government have to retain the confidence of the House. The hon. Gentleman is simply wrong. Some Members, in trying to argue that four years is the norm and five years is only for Governments who are clinging on to power, have pointed to examples of Parliaments that have lasted closer to four years than five. That completely overlooks the fact that elections that are called early, before the five-year term is up, are often those where the Prime Minister of the day thought that doing so might give their party a political advantage. It was not that they somehow thought that four years was the more constitutionally appropriate length of time for them to hold office. Advocates of three or four-year terms are using as their strongest argument the very enemy that the Bill is designed to combat, which is political expediency at the expense of national interest. The right hon. Member for Stirling (Mrs McGuire), who is no longer in her place, asked why Labour did not think of the idea in 1997. I can tell her that it was because the then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, wanted to preserve his ability to cut and run and seek an election at whatever opportunity he thought best.