Superannuation Bill

For the convenience of the Committee we will discuss together Amendments 12, 13, 14 and 15 which respond to the concerns expressed at Second Reading about what some noble Lords called the zombie clause. The Government also intend these amendments to respond to the comments about the unusual use of a sunrise provision in Clause 3(4)(c) that were made in the third report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which was published on 28 October. We are very grateful to the committee for its report, and we hope that these amendments respond to its criticisms. The committee rightly commented that ““these arrangements are complex””, but went on to say that these two delegated powers, "““do not appear to the Committee to be inappropriate””." However, the committee was not so persuaded by the need for the power in Clause 3(4)(c) to revive the caps. Its particular objection was to, "““a power which has no time limit, and which is therefore capable of being used in the context of future proposed amendments to the scheme, unrelated to the present circumstances””." These amendments aim to respond to that point, and I hope in speaking to them also to simplify, or at least clarify, some of the complexity in Clause 3. The Government accept that there should not be an unlimited power to revive Clause 2, which might be used many years in the future in circumstances that we could not predict today. On reflection, we accept that that is going too far, and I am therefore grateful to the Delegated Powers Committee for drawing it to the attention of the House. Accordingly, the Government have tabled these amendments which will provide a very similar set of limits on the Clause 3(4)(c) sunrise power as already apply to Clause 2. The effect of Amendment 14 is to provide for Clause 3(4)(c) itself to expire three years after Royal Assent—in effect, I am told, a ““sunset”” of the ““sunrise”” provision; I hope that the noble Lord likes that. The sunset of this power to revive Clause 2 would mean that it would be there, as the Government intend, as a fallback to revive the caps in Clause 2, just in case they were needed because of future problems in implementing the new Civil Service Compensation Scheme. The introduction of this three-year time-limit should provide the needed reassurance that this power to revive Clause 2 would not be available indefinitely to future Governments of whatever complexion. In the usual course of events, we would thus expect the power to expire during the life of this Parliament. However, again, we have provided in this amendment for a possible extension, by up to six months at a time, of the sunrise power. So, if this provision was exercised, the potential to revive the caps could last for, say, three years and six months rather than just three years, provided that such an order was made during the three-year period. What is specifically not being sought is for the sunrise clause itself to be capable of revival after it has expired. Members of the Committee may say that we are seeking powers in primary legislation that we hope never to use. That is of course absolutely right: we do not want to use these powers. We want agreement on a new reformed compensation scheme that can be implemented once this Bill has received Royal Assent, and which will mean that we never need to use the caps in Clause 2. However, the coalition Government are determined to ensure that there is certainty that a new and affordable scheme can be put in place. I very much hope that that is the view shared by all Members of the Committee. If all else fails, the Government are determined that there is a fallback position that can be used and that we are not left, as was the previous Government's scheme, stymied because of some sort of unforeseen legal challenge to the details of the new scheme. Once the Bill is passed, it will clearly be the will of Parliament that a new affordable compensation scheme is implemented. I accept that the provisions in Clause 3 to revive the caps in Clause 2 are complicated and unusual. We very much hope they need never be used. However, they are essential if we are to be 100 per cent certain that there will be a new, affordable scheme which we still hope may be acceptable to all the Civil Service unions. The changes in this group of government amendments will ensure that these unusual powers are not unlimited, and I very much hope that these changes will meet the concerns that have been expressed. Amendment 12 is a minor drafting amendment. Amendments 13 and 15 are consequential upon Amendment 14. I beg to move.