Superannuation Bill

There are, however, a substantial number of low-paid civil servants. I am rather surprised at the number of them earning less than £21,000, most of them working outside London. One of the Inland Revenue computer centres is half a mile from Saltaire, and I am well familiar with average rates of pay in the northern part of Bradford. The reason why the scheme is set to be biased in favour of those earning less than £23,000 is that there are a very large number of them. There are a small number of extremely well paid civil servants; the changes in the compensation scheme are also to limit the payouts to which they might be entitled. The amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady Turner, seem designed to remove the substance of the Bill. To rehearse briefly, the intention behind the Bill is to bring to a close two years of negotiation by successive Governments with the trade unions, to change a compensation scheme designed nearly 40 years ago, which does not fit current conditions or circumstances. Amendment 5 would, in practice, go further than the requirement in Section 2(3) of the Superannuation Act 1972, which, as I have explained, we have already needed to amend. First, under Section 1(3) of the 1972 Act, it is for the Minister to judge who should be consulted— "““persons appearing to the Minister … to represent persons likely to be affected by the proposed scheme””," or with those persons themselves. However, rather than requiring the agreement of those who have been consulted on this basis, Amendment 5 would prescribe that consultation must take place with ““the relevant trade unions”” and, indeed, that these unions must agree. We have already explained the efforts that successive Administrations of all parties have made, and which some of the trade unions have made, to reach such agreement. We are setting out in primary legislation and have reiterated in both Houses our commitment to meaningful consultation but, as I have described, our intention in adding Clause 1 was to remove any union veto on changes to the Civil Service Compensation Scheme. I cannot imagine that any of your Lordships will be surprised to learn that, after more than two years of consultation, the Government's view on this is resistant to change. The second respect in which the noble Baroness's Amendment 5 would go further than the approach set out in the 1972 Act is that it would apply to any changes proposed to the Civil Service Compensation Scheme, not just to those changes that would have the effect of reducing benefits. This would create a new bureaucratic process, in which any change to the compensation scheme including, to pick a trivial example, a minor amendment to its title would require consultation and agreement from all the Civil Service unions. Amendment 6, which is grouped with this, seeks to remove from the Bill the main provisions covering the potential caps on the value of benefits provided under the compensation scheme. This guts the Bill. The Government are determined that there is a fallback position that can be used and that, bearing in mind the lessons of the previous Administration's scheme, we are not left unable to progress due to some sort of unforeseen legal challenge to the details of the new scheme. We are therefore providing in Clause 2 to have in reserve the possibility of applying caps on the maximum value of redundancy payments under the Civil Service Compensation Scheme: a maximum of 12 months' pay for compulsory departures and 15 months' pay for voluntary departures. Putting these limits in primary legislation leads to greater legal certainty and democratic accountability and, as I have already remarked, the Government can, by negative order, raise the level of the caps, but cannot lower them. I hope that provides reassurance to the noble Baroness and that on that basis she will be willing to withdraw the amendment.