Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Bill [HL]

The reasonable suspicion criterion was a feature of the Bill that caused concern both in your Lordships’ House and elsewhere. Concern was expressed during passage of the temporary provisions Bill earlier this year; expressed by your Lordships’ Constitution Committee; and expressed by a number of your Lordships in Committee. The concern, quite simply, was that the Government should not enjoy the power to freeze a person’s assets, with all the damage and inconvenience that that involves, unless they have at least a reasonable belief that the person concerned is involved or associated with terrorist activity. That is why I tabled Amendment 3, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has added her name. It would substitute reasonable belief for reasonable suspicion. I am very pleased that the Minister has listened to the arguments. He has accepted that, other than for a temporary period of 30 days, assets should be frozen only when the Government believe, on reasonable grounds, that the individual is involved with terrorist activity. I am sure that all noble Lords will be grateful to the Minister and his team for their response to the expressions of concern, and for the care with which they have drafted and presented these amendments. For my part, I accept that it is appropriate for the Government to have an interim power to freeze assets for a period of 30 days simply on the basis of reasonable suspicion. I accept that because there may be cases when they have only limited information and reasonably wish to act to prevent dissipation of the assets while investigations are concluded. A period of 30 days seems a reasonable time for that interim exercise. Of course an interim order, although undoubtedly very inconvenient for the person concerned, will not have the same draconian effect as a freezing order that continues for a lengthy period. I welcome the government amendments. There are three points of detail in relation to the amendments in this group. First, it would be desirable for Amendment 29—the new clause which confers power on the Treasury—to make an interim designation to specify the purposes for which the power may be exercised. I am concerned that the drafting does not identify the specific mischief that the interim designation for 30 days is designed to meet. Subsection (1) of the proposed new clause simply repeats the substantive criteria for a final designation save that the criterion for the interim designation is reasonable suspicion rather than reasonable belief. It is surely necessary to specify in what circumstances the Treasury has a power to make an interim designation. Surely new subsection (1) in Amendment 29 should specify a third precondition after conditions (a) and (b), something to the effect that the Treasury considers that it does not have the information available to reach a conclusion on whether ““they reasonably believe that the person concerned satisfies the criteria in Clause 2(1)”” and that ““the Treasury consider that there is an urgent need”” to impose the restrictions for an interim period, while such a conclusion is reached. I invite the Minister to consider that matter before Report. My second point relates to new subsection (3) in Amendment 29. That prevents the Treasury from making more than one interim designation of the same person in relation to the same evidence. Such a restriction is of course needed to prevent repeated interim designations of the same person for more than one period of 30 days, but I invite the Minister to reconsider the phrase, ““the same evidence””. Surely he cannot intend that a second interim designation could be made of the same person simply because there is now an additional piece of evidence which adds nothing of substance. I suggest that it would be preferable to refer in subsection (3) to ““substantially the same evidence””. My third point concerns Amendment 31, which in new subsection (2) addresses the expiry of an interim designation. It states that where an interim designation expires after 30 days, the Treasury must, "““take such steps as they consider appropriate””," to bring that fact, "““to the attention of the persons informed of the designation””." I suggest that the Treasury should be held to a much higher standard. Surely, if the Treasury has imposed an interim designation for 30 days, and the interim designation has expired, so that the restrictions on the individual are removed, it should be required to take all reasonable steps to ensure that all those notified of the interim designation are notified that it has ended. After all, the interim designation will not have led to a final designation because, although there was reasonable suspicion, there is no basis for any reasonable belief that the person concerned is involved in terrorist activity. The same point arises in relation to Amendment 32, which concerns variation or revocation of the interim designation. Subject to those drafting points, to which we may need to return on Report, I am very pleased that the Government have confined final designations to cases of reasonable belief, and have confined interim designations based on reasonable suspicion to a period of 30 days.