That, of course, is also what the Committee thinks.
One of the Committee's principal objections is that the lack of general consultation may create a greater sense of disconnection between the Government's decisions and the understanding of the people at large on defence issues. With regard to the public view of defence, there is a gap between what politicians say and what the public believe. In relation to Iraq, the British people became, towards the end of our engagement there, broadly opposed, mostly because of the very poor planning on what to do after we had won the war. There is a great degree of scepticism about the purpose of our deployment in Afghanistan. In my view, our people would support our deployment to Afghanistan if they thought we had a good strategy for winning, but at the moment they do not think that.
That gap between the public view and the country's policy is both very important and deeply worrying. The SDSR was an opportunity to narrow the gap, but because of the speed with which it is being carried out, that opportunity has been missed. We in the defence community must therefore do all we can, not only in the UK but across Europe, to explain defence policy and our defence needs to the public. Without such communication, notwithstanding the country's general support for the armed forces, defence will suffer.
That contrasts with the 1997-98 defence review, which was announced during the Queen's Speech in May 1997 and reported, later than originally expected, just over 13 months later in July 1998. There was a good deal of consultation during the preparation of that review. The Defence Committee of the day played its part in that, holding 12 evidence sessions while the review was in preparation and eight more afterwards. It also produced a weighty three-volume report on the review—I do not know whether anybody read it, but at least somebody had the time to write it. It was a good review, but I would make two points about it. First, it ended up being underfunded, because it was overtaken by events. Secondly, I would caution the right hon. Member for Coventry North East (Mr Ainsworth), the shadow Defence Secretary, because it was held at a time when the British economy was strong, the Labour Government having received one of the best economic legacies in the history of this country. Before the shadow Secretary of State makes too much of his suggestion that this one is a cost-cutting farce—
Strategic Defence and Security Review
Proceeding contribution from
Lord Arbuthnot of Edrom
(Conservative)
in the House of Commons on Thursday, 16 September 2010.
It occurred during Backbench debate on Strategic Defence and Security Review.
Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
515 c1040-1 
Session
2010-12
Chamber / Committee
House of Commons chamber
Subjects
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Timestamp
2023-12-15 18:33:24 +0000
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