Crime and Security Bill

My Lords, I certainly did not understand wash-up before, and I am still not sure that I do understand it. However, it seems to me to be an agreement between the main parties about finding a way ahead, so I was rather taken aback by the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Jones, listing a great long list of proposals for what is intended to be done. My understanding was that it was only because of an agreement that this has come through—but clearly I have been taken flat aback on that one and do not understand what is going on. But that was my understanding of it. In any event, as has been said, the proposed amendments would replace our proposal with a variant of the Scottish retention model. It was discussed, of course, in the other place, where it was pressed to a Division and defeated by some 79 votes. As the Committee will be aware, Scotland has a very different approach to the retention of fingerprints and DNA from the one that the Bill proposes. The Scottish model is that DNA samples and resulting profiles must be destroyed if the individual is not convicted or granted an absolute discharge, and DNA may be retained for those not convicted only if they are suspected of certain sexual or violent offences, when it may be retained for three years. That can be extended at perhaps two years at a time with the approval of a sheriff. While there was some support for the Scottish retention model during the Bill’s earlier stages in the other place, it should be noted that the Scottish Executive, as with so many other things that the Scottish Executive do, arrived at their model with no research whatever. It was just plucked out of the air. The model also has significant operational limitations. As the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Jones, says, it is not just the Government’s view that the Scottish model poses problems for the police; the Scottish Association of Chief Police Officers said in February 2008: ""Our position is that we should move into line, after discussion with Scottish Government, with England and Wales and DNA samples should be taken and retained under strict guidelines from offenders. We are in favour of mirroring any legislation in the UK Parliament allowing the taking and retention of DNA samples from persons arrested for an offence"." It is interesting to note the talk about higher detection rates in the Scottish example. That is not the case. The Scottish DNA database does not have a higher success rate. The figures quoted on one occasion look at 2005-06 figures and do not compare like with like. The latest like-for-like data, from 2008-09, show that the England and Wales database has a 13 per cent higher success rate than Scotland, so the Scottish Association of Chief Police Officers is correct and our system is somewhat better. More significantly, consideration also needs to be given to the underlying principal question in this amendment of whether the biometric data of those not convicted of an offence should be treated differently depending on the nature of the offence under investigation. Potentially, that could create different levels of innocence, depending on what it is that someone has not done. We propose a single retention period regardless of the seriousness of the offence for which a person has been arrested. The best available evidence indicates that the type of offence for which they are first arrested is not a good indicator of the seriousness of the offence that he or she might subsequently commit. The Scottish model, proposed in the amendment, therefore risks missing many detections of serious offences due to the nature of the offence originally under investigation. For example, in 2008-09 alone, there were at least 79 rape, murder or manslaughter cases in England and Wales that were matched to the DNA database from DNA profiles that belong to individuals who had been arrested but not convicted of any crime. Of that number, in 36 cases the matches were found to have had a direct and specific value to the investigation. If we had applied the Scottish retention regime and retained DNA profiles only from those arrested but not convicted of a serious crime, at least 23 victims of the most serious crimes, and of course their families, could have been denied justice last year alone. In the light of the above, and as the retention of DNA is not punitive but a measure to facilitate the detection of future offences, we believe that a single retention period is the correct way forward. Indeed, on the point of it not being punitive, a number of speakers have talked about being on the database as being a stigma. I believe that it is a stigma only if people know that someone is on the database. I personally have no concern about being on it. Almost nobody knows that someone is on the database. It is a stigma only if someone knows that you are there. On the Motions that Clauses 14 to 23 should not stand part of the Bill, I point out that if these Motions were carried we could be no further forward than we were at the beginning of last year. We would still be in breach of the European Court’s ruling, as a number of noble Lords have said, and we would not have a legislative framework for the retention of DNA profiles and fingerprints. We consider that our DNA retention proposals represent an appropriate balance between public protection and protecting individuals’ rights and liberties, based on the best available research. We also believe that it will meet ECHR requirements and the ECHR judgment. While some have criticised elements of our research evidence, I remind your Lordships of the key points that the evidence points us to. We can justify retaining the DNA of people who have been arrested but not convicted while the risk of offending is higher than that of the general population. Our analysis suggests that that risk, as measured by the risk of rearrest, is higher than the general population for six years following the first arrest. While arrest is only a proxy indicator of the risk of offending, the nature and volume of data currently available to us mean that a more precise arrest/conviction analysis is likely to be less reliable. Yes, we can do more work, but at least we have done some analysis, unlike under the Scottish system. The precise length of time to equalise the risk may vary in either direction due to the uncertainties in the analysis and data. On balance, these uncertainties are more likely to extend the time that it takes for these risks to be equal, which would argue in fact for a longer retention period. But we must do analysis and look at this in much more detail. The noble Earl, Lord Onslow, referred to samples being taken from volunteers. Those samples can and must be removed from the database on request, and DNA from a volunteer is put on the database only in very exceptional circumstances, at the explicit request of the volunteer. Ultimately, the evidence can only go so far to answering the question of what is an appropriate retention period. When there are statistical uncertainties around the estimate, the final decision must be one based on judgment—it is not precise yet—and not evidence alone. But we are trying to build up more evidence to get a better database. That is how we arrived at a retention period of six years, the point at which our research tells us that the risk of rearrest returns to the risk of arrest in the general population. We consider that our proposals are a cogent and considered package and represent a huge change from the situation as it stands, as was touched on by the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Jones, taking us from a blanket indefinite retention, whereby innocent and guilty are treated alike, and whereby DNA profiles are kept as long as DNA profiles—two finite periods based on research and differentiating between different categories of individual. We further believe that the safeguards outlined in Clause 23 relating to the national DNA database strategy board provide sufficient scrutiny and oversight of the process and will result in clear and consistent guidance being issued in future on the destruction and deletion of profiles. A number of speakers touched on that point. I am particularly disappointed that, after all the consensual work done in the other place to put into place a new role for the strategy board, noble Lords wish to remove Clause 23. I also put on record my gratitude to the official Opposition for agreeing, as part of the wash-up, that our proposed retention framework should be put on the statute book. That agreement means that we can bring an end to the somewhat protracted process of responding to the judgment of the European Court, giving some certainty to both the police service and the public at large that biometric data will be held under a specific and detailed statutory regime. On that basis, I ask that Amendment 2 be withdrawn and that Clauses 14 and 23 should stand part of the Bill.