Powers of Entry etc. Bill [HL]

My Lords, the suggestion that there is some significant difference between warrants and court orders authorising entry is probably wrong. The Bill introduced by the noble Lord, Lord Selsdon, is aimed primarily at controlling powers of entry that are added to rules, regulations, statutes and statutory instruments for the purposes of assisting some requirements in the regulation of the many complexities of the society in which we live. Court-authorised powers of entry have been part of civil law for many years. Powers of entry for the purposes of enabling search and seizure of documents to take place are the best example of that. They used to be called Anton Piller orders—the name derives from the case in which such orders were first granted. When the practice began, the orders were much too readily granted. In the opinion of many, including me, they led to abuse of the powers of the court, with insufficient protection for those against whom the orders were made. Since then, the procedure has been much tightened. The orders are more difficult to get. They are always granted without notice, but there is an immediate hearing with both parties represented when the matter can be looked at on both sides. I mention this in connection with the noble Lord’s Bill because the civil courts have established rules and procedures intended to safeguard the interests of the person whose premises are to be peremptorily entered and searched and whose documents are at risk of being seized. Some of the provisions of the Bill deal with what precautions there should be for the person who is subject to these orders. I suggest that in any reconsideration of the Bill—although I understand that it will almost certainly not survive falling into the abyss on the election and will have to be revived consequent on the election by whoever are the Government in power—civil practices, and the rules and regulations that have been tested over many years and are well known to lawyers and many firms and companies that have been the subject of these orders, might form a good model for the powers to go into the Bill. Perhaps I may make one or two further comments. First, the authority to enter does not necessarily derive from a Minister. Many powers of entry are derived from the authority of a quango or regulator that has been given powers to authorise others to enter. Of course, all those powers are derived in the last resort from statute, but to say that the authorised person is necessarily authorised by a Minister is wrong and too narrow. Secondly, the alternative to entry by warrant or court order—I really do not think that there is any significant distinction between them—is to enter by consent. Entry by consent must always be permissible. If entry is by consent, one does not need to limit the number of people or provide any precautions. The consent authorises whatever is proposed to be done or limits, according to the wishes of the person concerned, what may be done. The Bill should be directed towards entry by warrant or court order. There should be a clear distinction between entry by consent and entry by court order/warrant. Those are the only additional comments that I want to make on the Bill.