Powers of Entry etc. Bill [HL]

My Lords, I have given the Minister notice of my wish to get an ex cathedra reply to my query about the word "order" in line 10 of Clause 5. The essence of my noble friend’s Bill is, as we all know, to curtail the unfettered, widespread and extensive powers of entry that litter our legislation. The principal point that I have always made is that such powers of entry should in general, which of course means with exceptions, be subject to a magistrate’s warrant. A magistrate’s warrant is an ancient and well understood part of the way in which we do things in this country. Indeed, the idea that the police, with exceptions, have to obtain a warrant before entering private premises for the purposes of a search has always made the conduct of our police force much more acceptable to the public than is the case in many other countries. I therefore ask the Government whether the word "order" encompasses the word "warrant". An essential point about a warrant is that it is a piece of paper, signed by a magistrate, which the person exercising powers of entry has to present to the person whose premises he wishes to enter. My concern is that an order is a more amorphous concept that could have a much wider application and could therefore exclude the crucial test of whether or not the exercise of the powers of entry are justified in the particular instance. Let me say at once that I have never been opposed to powers of entry, which must be part of any ordered society. Indeed, there are areas in which greater powers are needed. I give just one example. We are all horrified by the all too frequent cases of child abuse, often of the most terrible and heinous nature. In the extensive inquiries that follow, the social services responsible often claim that they had not been able to get sufficient access to investigate or monitor the situation. My remedy is that the social services should be able to get what I would describe as a running warrant—one that would be exercisable over a limited period of perhaps some weeks and would be renewable—empowering entry. That would, in effect, require the social services to judge how serious a case might be. It would be a useful defence for them to be able to show that they had applied for and received such a warrant against any accusations that they had been asleep on a case. I merely cite this as an example, because my worry is that an amorphous court order might be a much less satisfactory means of proceeding.