Bribery Bill [Lords]

I certainly agree with my hon. Friend. What seems to happen, as the decades go by, is that the world view of countries' propensity to tolerate bribery alters. When I was younger there seemed to be a widespread view that this country was intolerant of bribery and that many foreign countries, including countries in the European Union, were prepared to tolerate it, particularly in the contexts of bribing officials abroad and achieving economic benefits for that state. I seem to remember that it was rather widely suggested that the United States turned a blind eye to the bribery of foreign officials, but it is worth pointing out that, for the most part, all those countries appear to have tightened up their acts considerably. Indeed, it has been argued that the United Kingdom, having started out as a paragon of virtue, has slipped precisely because we have perhaps been rather complacent about some of the changes that were taking place, which we have not properly addressed. We should bear all that in mind, but I certainly agree that there are two different issues: the laws that we implement and the manner of their enforcement. As our country has a good reputation, on the whole, on enforcing the laws that we enact, I am anxious—as, I am sure, is the Lord Chancellor—that we should not, as a result of enacting and enforcing vigorously the laws that the OECD wants, end up in the position of finding that our European partners are taking a much more lax approach. I certainly endorse the Government co-operating with our fellow members of the EU and the Government of the US in trying to ensure that there is a level playing field. There is no doubt that one reason why the bribery of foreign officials has taken place has been the claim, "Well, if we don't do it, the others will." Until we get away from that mindset we will not bring about the changes that I think are so badly needed. Although the bribery of foreign officials may not have a direct impact here, we cannot escape the fact that it is enormously damaging to the rule of law and the integrity of the public service in the countries where it does happen. Moreover, because there is often collusion at the highest level, bribery can promote a culture of kick-backs that is not conducive to good commercial relations in the long term across the globe. For all those reasons, therefore, the bribery of officials is a pernicious phenomenon that we would do well to tackle. I was grateful to the Lord Chancellor for going into detail on a matter that arose earlier—the question of safeguards and the security services, as covered by clause 10. We recognise that the security services must have an exemption: there can be no doubt about that, and not to have an understanding that they must be given that exemption would be to fly in the face of reality. We are pleased that the Government have restricted the exemption in the case of law-enforcement agencies, and I do not have too many anxieties about the exemptions given to the armed forces, given how they have to operate in reality, certainly in countries such as Afghanistan. However, I am rather keener on the extra level of protection inserted in clause 10 by the other place. I shall explain why to the Secretary of State, and the matter can doubtless be teased out again in Committee. There is a considerable difference between providing a defence for something, which can be argued in court, and providing a safeguard for a public official who is carrying out a function that he believes he has been specifically told to carry out on the basis that it will not be a criminal offence. As I am sure that the Lord Chancellor is aware, a person who is prosecuted gets put through a process that is deeply unpleasant, even when it ends in acquittal. That must not be embarked on lightly. However, when an action taken by the security services is authorised as acceptable at the highest level—even though it might otherwise be in breach of this Bribery Bill—it is pretty much inconceivable that the person involved will ever be prosecuted, as the Lord Chancellor said. If that is the case, though, should not the ability to invoke the safeguard provided as a result of the scrutiny of this Bill in the House of Lords also be retained? I simply flag the matter up, and we can doubtless have a debate about it in Committee. If the Lord Chancellor feels that that proposal would lead to profound problems, we will be able to articulate them in Committee, as this is more a matter for Committee than Second Reading. However, we think that the Bill has been improved marginally in the other place, and that this is one example of that. We would be sorry to lose the provision, unless good reason can be shown for doing so. I want to return to one matter in connection with clause 7, which provides for an offence of negligence. This House needs to be very careful when creating offences of negligence that can attract substantial penalties. The clause requires systems to be set up but, if those systems are absent, the defence that may exist for a corporation will disappear. I have no difficulty with that at all. It is clearly a serious matter when commercial organisations fail to prevent bribery, and the architecture of the Bill would collapse if clause 7 did not exist. For those reasons, it has to be there but, as I highlighted to the Lord Chancellor in my interventions, I have some concerns about whether adequate guidance is in place to ensure that commercial organisations are on the right side of the law. In many respects, the provision represents a regulatory aspect of the Bill, and I think that it needs to be included. I asked the Lord Chancellor about the US, where companies can speak to the Department of Justice and seek guidance on individual payments. That is a regulatory framework and seems to work quite well, but we are not going to have anything like it here. For that reason, it is something that will merit further attention. Finally, there is one matter that is not contained in this Bill, but which was covered by the draft Bill—the whole issue of parliamentary privilege. The Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State will remember our debates on the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority last summer. Opposition Members made it clear that we did not think that the criminal offences being created for Members of Parliament were suitable, because we took the view that the matter should properly be dealt with in the Bribery Bill. We were wholly supportive of the notion that the possible defence of parliamentary privilege that might be invoked to escape prosecution for an offence of bribery should be made unavailable. That has not happened, although I am well aware why the Secretary of State has chosen not to make it unavailable. I think that he took the view that, in light of the Select Committee's report, that approach would be much too controversial and get Parliament bogged down. It may be that there is a slightly academic element to the argument, particularly in light of everything else that we have done in respect of setting up IPSA. Something in me suspects that such circumstances are unlikely, or will occur only very rarely, but this is unfinished business. To resolve the matter, at some point we will either have to do something in bribery legislation or—and this may be better—introduce a proper parliamentary privilege Act. Neither approach is easy, and I simply suggest to the Lord Chancellor that it might be easier to legislate on an exemption in a Bribery Bill than to have a parliamentary privilege Act, particularly in view of some of the controversies surrounding privilege. Again, I hope that we will be able to look at that when the Bill is in Committee. I am not particularly prescriptive on the subject, but the public will need some reassurance that we are taking the matter seriously in the long term. I do not intend to take up more of the House's time. I am grateful to the Secretary of State for exposing himself to this private grilling from the Opposition Front Bench as he has responded to the various questions asked. It is a rather uncharacteristic form of debate, but one that is probably very productive. We wish the Bill well. We will try to ensure that it goes on the statute book in the course of this Parliament, and in a form that commands the widest possible acceptance.