Terrorist Asset-Freezing (Temporary Provisions) Bill

It is good that for the first time, we are debating what is in the orders, at least to some extent. It has been mentioned that we should have had an opportunity to do so before now. I recall from the passage of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 that that Bill included a section dealing with asset-freezing orders and some aspects of how they could be challenged. The right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg), the hon. Member for Meirionnydd Nant Conwy (Mr. Llwyd) and I tabled some amendments that would have permitted us to debate those clauses, but as so often happens on Report, as a result of the timetabling motion, our amendments were never reached, so no debate on the orders ever took place. What we are being asked to do today is to overturn the Supreme Court's decision. It is important to recognise that that does not simply involve dealing with a technical error. The Supreme Court did not overturn the orders on a technical issue; it quashed them in strong language, as was pointed out. In this emergency legislation, we are effectively bringing into law orders that were quashed by the Supreme Court in strong language. It is interesting to read the retrospective bits in the Bill. One will protect the banks during the period from the Supreme Court's decision to Royal Assent. What would the position be of somebody who gave money during that period to someone who was subject to a freezing order? Would they have any protection? The orders put into effect UN Security Council resolution 1373, which concerns preventing and suppressing the financing of terrorist acts and criminalising"““the wilful provision or collection…of funds…with the intention that the funds should be used…to carry out terrorist acts””." We used the United Nations Act 1946 to bring the orders into force. They allowed the Treasury to designate individuals against whom measures should be taken, and the Bill will keep them in force. It then becomes a criminal offence for any person to make available any funds—there is no de minimis level—to the designated person. Licences are granted to allow the designated person to receive payments for their daily living expenses, but the operation of those licences has been such that those people and their families have had to produce detailed accounts for the Treasury of every penny that they have spent. I hope that, when we eventually debate the draft Bill after it has been published, we will look into the need for a requirement to consider whether there is evidence that could lead to a prosecution before using the designation mechanism. As it stands, there is no necessity to establish a connection between the designation and any suspicion of involvement in terrorist activity. The description of the orders as ““draconian”” by the Supreme Court has already been mentioned, as has their effect on the individuals concerned. Sometimes, their effects have been quite astonishing. For instance, in 2008, some people who were the subject of these orders wrote to the Treasury to ask whether it was permissible under the orders to buy new boots, trainers and shoes. The Treasury responded that this raised complex issues about what constituted a basic expense as opposed to an extraordinary expense, and that these were matters for which ministerial approval would be required. That was the extent to which the orders were impinging on the lives of the individuals who were subject to them.