Terrorist Asset-Freezing (Temporary Provisions) Bill

I am sure that that is right. The right hon. and learned Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham (Mr. Hogg) referred to the fact that the Supreme Court justices had described this whole process as an offence against democracy, and that is a striking way of summarising what the right hon. Gentleman says about Parliament being the democratic forum in which these debates are properly conducted. Let me turn to the reasons why the Supreme Court justices considered these powers, which we are legitimising for a further period—the best part of a year—as draconian, drastic, oppressive and paralysing, and go over some of the points that were made. The Government quoted Lord Brown in support a few moments ago because he ruled in their favour on one order. None the less, Lord Brown said in his comments:"““The draconian nature of the regime imposed under these asset-freezing Orders can hardly be overstated. Construe and apply them how one will—and to my mind they should have been construed and applied altogether more benevolently than they appear to have been—they are scarcely less restrictive of the day-to-day life of those designated (and in some cases their families) than are control orders. In certain respects, indeed, they could be thought to be even more paralysing.””" As for the orders' impact on family life, the former Home Secretary, the right hon. Member for Redditch (Jacqui Smith), intervened a few moments ago to say that the Government had made an announcement to the effect that the family provisions would be relaxed. However, as I understand it, they are being enforced currently, and were described by a Supreme Court justice in the following terms:"““The overall result is very burdensome on all the members of the designated person's family. The impact on normal family life is remorseless and it can be devastating””." That language is not moderate, especially coming from people in a profession normally associated with understatement. The deputy president, Lord Hope, concluded in discussing the orders:"““The consequences of the Orders that were made in this case are so drastic and so oppressive that we must be just as alert to see that the coercive action that the Treasury have taken really is within the powers that the 1946 Act has given them.””" That is strong stuff. We should take note of it, not merely of the purely legal points being disputed. We return to two central principles. The first is the point about reasonable suspicion. The notes prepared for us by Justice and Liberty state that other countries with similar approaches to the law have also grappled with this problem: what is the right balance between absolute proof and reasonable suspicion? Even the Australians, who could hardly be accused of being soft on terrorism and who have had to cope with bombings in Bali and elsewhere, apply a tougher standard of proof. A Minister must be persuaded that an individual is involved in terrorism. That is a somewhat stricter test than reasonable suspicion, which is why my colleague and hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge and I have tabled amendments to strengthen the safeguards on that point. On appeals, it is worth recalling again what Lord Rodger, another justice, said:"““the harsh reality is that mistakes in designating will inevitably occur and, when they do, the individuals who are wrongly designated will find their funds and assets frozen and their lives disrupted, without their having any realistic prospect of putting matters right.””" That is why appeals should be heard on issues of substance and not simply of procedure.