Terrorist Asset-Freezing (Temporary Provisions) Bill

I will address that point slightly later, because it touches on the issue of designation, on which it is important to debate the test that the Government must meet. Just to clarify, the Supreme Court struck down the legal basis for the Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order 2006. However, two further terrorism orders depend on the same provision in the 1946 Act, which is why they are the subject of the legislation before us today. There is a fourth order—the Al-Qaida and Taliban (United Nations Measures) Order 2006—of which the Supreme Court struck down article 3(1)(b), which concerns United Nations Security Council resolution 1267, and I will touch on that in more depth in a moment or two. The history of our fight on this front is not long. The asset-freezing regime introduced by the Security Council dates back only to 1999, when it was established as part of the fight against the Taliban. It was quickly extended to include Osama bin Laden and persons associated with al-Qaeda. In the weeks following 11 September 2001, the UN created a separate requirement on member states to freeze the assets involved in terrorism more generally, where individuals were identified by member states. The way in which the Government responded allowed us to act quickly. Using secondary legislation under the 1946 Act, we ensured that our freezing regime was in place by 10 October 2001, just 12 days after the United Nations made its resolution in New York. The United Kingdom was the first nation to be judged fully compliant with the international standards set by the Financial Action Task Force. Today, around £375,000 in suspected terrorist assets is frozen. That includes around £150,000 frozen under the secondary legislation in the terrorism orders. A much smaller figure is frozen under the Terrorism Act 2006, on which the Supreme Court passed judgment. When, therefore, the Supreme Court struck down the legal basis on which we acted in good faith, we thought it imperative to act rapidly to present this Bill before the House. Our use of the United Nations Act 1946 was, as I have argued, logical because it says that the Government can make provisions through Orders in Council when ““necessary or expedient””. As my hon. Friend the Exchequer Secretary has already pointed out, the Court of Appeal agreed with the judgment; the Supreme Court did not, which is why we find ourselves here this afternoon.