Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill (Money) (No. 3)

I do not want to go into this too far, because I think the Chair would stop me. The right hon. Gentleman gets it wrong. If there is a sequential vote, as there is in his example, the Gummer supporters can say, ““I'm not quite so sure. I don't think my chap is going to win if it goes on like that. He is only a couple of votes ahead of Straw.”” Because the Gummer supporter is able to vote again, he may vote for Cormack. We had a vote in the House not long ago in which that was precisely what many Members did. It is a different system and not one that I am proposing. I am merely saying that the sequential system is fundamentally different and fairer than the AV system. I know that others want to speak so I shall conclude my remarks. I am sorry that there are now only three Liberal Democrats in the Chamber, as I have more to say about their approach to the new clauses that we are discussing. The Liberal Democrats have said that they are going to vote for AV even though they accept that it is no more proportional—indeed, it may be less proportional—than first past the post, because it is baby steps towards proportional representation. That is a very suitable phrase for the Liberal Democrats. I ceased to be a liberal at the age of 11—I grew out of it—and that is one of the issues here. The point about the Liberal Democrats is that they will do anything to change the system, because the present system does not do them the justice that they feel they should have. They would even move from first past the post to a less fair system so that they get more votes. What kind of principle is that? The Secretary of State said that this is a matter of principle. I have heard no principle from those who support these new clauses. Therefore, I hope that the Committee will consider four points. First, there is a fundamental difference between reform and change. The Secretary of State has been talking about change as if it were reform. If he were bringing this change forward alongside the Wright Committee recommendations in a manner that enabled the House to discuss and vote on them properly, we might believe in the reform agenda, but there is no motion before us to stop automatic guillotines, for example, or to provide that we will sit for as long as it takes properly to discuss issues. There is no motion to require 100 hours in Committee before a guillotine. All those suggestions would keep the Executive under closer control. We cannot apply the word ““reform”” to a move from first past the post to something that is less fair and more complex. The second point is that those of us who are passionate supporters of the European Union, as I am, have gone to great trouble to look at the systems of our neighbours. It would be good if we had a more common approach. However, none of them has a system that I would swap for ours. The disadvantages in every other country are clear, and I shall give one example. If anyone knows a Dutch MP, they will know that he is elected under a perfectly proportional system, but has no interest in a constituency, because in order to be perfectly proportional the system can never be constituency-based. The third point is that decisions on constitutional matters taken for party political reasons are always bound to fail—apart from also being fundamentally wrong. Parties of all kinds have tried it, and all of them have discovered that it don't work. The last point—