Children, Schools and Families Bill

I hope that, as I go into the detail of our amendment, that differentiation will become clear. However, let me say to the hon. Gentleman, as I have said before, that I am happy to look at some of these issues further to see if changes need to be made in the other place. I hope that he will forgive me if, for the moment, I stick to arguing my case as I have it before me. Those amendments seek to assist the operation of the legislation. I hope that they will satisfy some of the calls for additional clarity, because I accept that originally the provisions were rather opaque. Amendments 131 and 132 would plug the gap in ensuring that a person who has provided a statement to the court within the relevant proceedings would count, along with witnesses actually called to give evidence, as being "involved in" proceedings for the purpose of the Bill. On amendment 130, I accept that, as has been mentioned by the hon. Members for North-West Norfolk and for Yeovil (Mr. Laws), the addition of a list similar to that in section 121(3) of the Australian Family Law Act 1975 was strongly advocated by a wide variety of stakeholders. We have therefore accepted that it is appropriate to include in the Bill a list of what constitutes "identification information". Having said that, I believe that the Bill, as introduced, was fit for purpose and that provisions on what constitutes information "likely to identify" are equally so. I am aware of the need for as much clarity as possible if the Bill is to work as intended, so the amendment builds on the Australian model and provides additional guidance for both parties and the media as to what constitutes "identification information", highlighting the sorts of information that are most likely to be "identifying" and in respect of which particular care should accordingly be taken. In addition, amendment 117 adds a provision that mirrors section 97(2)(b) of the Children Act 1989 in prohibiting publication of information likely to identify the home address or the school of a child involved in proceedings. That would remove any scope for arguments as to whether such information might identify the child. The hon. Member for North-West Norfolk made a number of points that have been raised by the judiciary and, in particular, by Sir Mark Potter, and I hope that he will accept that although amendments 115, 118 and 119 are technical, they address the points made by the senior judiciary. Amendments 118 and 119 would remove the additional explanations of what amounts to""information relating to the proceedings"." That term will continue to have the meaning established by the case law on the identical wording in section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960. Amendment 115 mirrors section 97(2) of the 1989 Act—and the Australian legislation—in referring to identification by members of the public, rather than by "one or more persons", which might have had the unintended effect of preventing publication in almost every case however little information might be made available. Within those provisions, however, not only do we wish to ensure privacy where required, but we wish to make reporting as open as it can be. We have, thus, responded to concerns in that regard too. Amendments 116, 117, 118, 121, 124 and 126 would remove references to persons "referred to in" proceedings from clauses 34, 37, 38 and 41. That would mean that the publication of identification information relating to persons referred to in proceedings but with no direct link to them—I call this the David Beckham amendment, because it deals with cases where a child's favourite footballer or pop star is mentioned—would not be prohibited, as clearly that is not what is intended. Having said that, there may occasionally be exceptional cases where the court would need to protect a person who is "referred to" in proceedings, as opposed to more actively involved. Such a person might be, for example, a neighbour who has reported domestic violence to the police. The Government feel that the court's discretionary power to restrict publication in clause 37(2) will cover such situations. These amendments do not cover references to a person "referred to in" proceedings in clauses 35 and 36, because they serve a different purpose. In clause 35, the avoiding of an injustice to a person referred to in the proceedings, or the protection of the welfare of a child or vulnerable adult referred to in the proceedings, may well be a reason for permitting the publication of information. The court will decide this, and in so deciding whether to permit that publication, it will have to take into account the risk that would be posed to the safety or welfare of a person "referred to". A number of concerns have been raised about the contempt provisions for circumstances where the reporting restrictions are breached. Amendments 119 and 120 deal specifically with defences to contempt of court. The amendments provide those republishing information from another publication with a defence if they did not know, and had no reason to suspect at the time of publication, that the information already published was in breach of any of the requirements for an authorised news publication. Without the amendments, there would be a risk that someone republishing information already in the public domain could find themselves charged with contempt for publishing information that they could not have known was in breach of reporting restrictions. Although it is right and proper that the courts pursue those who knowingly publish information that is in breach of reporting restrictions governing family proceedings, it is also right and proper that those who seek only to inform the public in good faith are provided with a defence against being held in contempt of court. So that the courts can continue to authorise publication in individual cases, amendment 111 responds to judicial concerns raised in the evidence of the president of the family division, Sir Mark Potter, and is intended to make it clear that courts may continue in the exercise of their inherent jurisdiction to authorise disclosure of information in limited circumstances not covered by rules of court, at the request of the parties or upon the court's own motion. Finally, we have considered the concerns about the review process that will be required prior to moving to a more open second phase. I understand that the hon. Member for Yeovil has particular concerns about this area, and I hope that amendments 122 and 123 will allay some of them. Our amendments would require that the Lord Chancellor commissions an independent review of part 2 of the Bill before the amendments concerning sensitive personal information in schedule 2 may be commenced. We recognise that it is in everyone's interest, particularly that of children, that we get the review process right and ensure that the initial set of changes are subject to a considered and robust examination—it would be in nobody's interest to do anything less.