Children, Schools and Families Bill

It has been used in a great number of cases. As I said earlier, many of them turned on the application of the European convention on human rights through the European Court of Human Rights. One interesting case involved a person accused of engaging in unreasonable behaviour vis-à-vis a child. The jury acquitted the person in question, but the case was then overridden by the European Court on the grounds of human rights. I find this a very difficult issue. A jury in a criminal case might conclude, on the basis of the evidence given, that the accused should be acquitted. However, when the case is referred to the European Court, that Court can say that it does not care about a decision made under English or UK law. The European Court can say, "We have our principles and we're going to apply them, irrespective of other law." In effect, it can override our criminal law, and I find that very difficult to accept. What has happened since—this is obviously part and parcel of the proposed amendments to the Children Act 2004 as well—is that the Government have made an assessment of the extent to which, as an absolute rule, there must be no infliction of any physical punishment at all, whether reasonable or not. It appears that that prohibition applies even when the punishment causes a mere reddening of the skin and is permissible according to the legal analysis to which I referred earlier. Against that background, therefore, I am interested in whether there is an absolute prohibition simply because it is prescribed under the arrangements for the European convention on human rights, which has effectively created a complete prohibition, overriding jury decisions in criminal trials, for example; whether it is—to use an expression that comes up in this context—a matter of philosophical attitude, which is another thing and is discussed at some length in the research materials that have been provided; or whether it is just a knee-jerk reaction, without reference to the impact on the class, the other pupils in the school or the teachers, and without reference to whether there is violence against the teacher or against other children in the class. In other words, what is the principle that determines whether a perfectly reasonable form of punishment, which is allowed in loco parentis, should be denied in the classroom? That is the question that needs to be properly discussed. I have a feeling, although I might be wrong, that the Secretary of State has taken an absolutist position based on the research materials, which refer to philosophical attitudes and so on. That may be unrealistic. So we—I and those who think along similar lines—are not anxious to permit any unreasonable punishment, but where it is a legitimate course of action in loco parentis, I am searching for an answer to the question why it is allowed in those circumstances, but not allowed in circumstances where there is violence in the classroom, even against the teacher himself or herself. Why should teachers be denied the opportunity to carry out reasonable punishment of the same kind as a person in loco parentis? That is what I think is important. New clause 10 proposes as a criterion:""Only a person with parental responsibility for a child within the meaning of section 3 of the Children Act 1989 can justify battery of the child on the ground that it constituted reasonable punishment."" Ironically, although the hon. Member for Mid-Dorset and North Poole seemed to be arguing the contrary, the fact is that her own new clause, within the framework of section 58 of the Children Act 2004, admits that a person with parental responsibility for a child can justify battery on the ground that it constituted reasonable punishment. I invite the Secretary of State to respond. He has his own version of events, but the Singleton review will be definitive.