Financial Services Bill

This debate has followed a well-trodden path on which we trampled extensively during the Bill's Second Reading and mercilessly during the Committee proceedings, and I feel that we are going to do so again in the remaining time available. It is therefore with a certain sense of ennui that I rehearse the Government's arguments as to why we believe that the existing tripartite framework is the right model. My sense of ennui is lightened only by the fact that as we have gone on through these debates, I have begun to be excited by my realisation that I know even less now than I did before about what the Opposition would do if they came to power. When it comes to the issue of who is in charge, we have clear answers, but I do not believe the Opposition do. They need to explain who will be in charge—will it be the Governor of the Bank of England? Will it be the Chancellor of the Exchequer? Simply proposing to move around the deckchairs by getting rid of the FSA and transferring its powers to the Bank of England does not answer the question of who is in charge, and it does not substitute for the fact that what is most important is the exercise of judgment. Our answer to the question of who is in charge is very clear. Each of the tripartite authorities has its responsibilities and tools for financial stability, and the key thing is that their analyses, including of long-term systemic risks and approaches, are effectively aligned and co-ordinated. That is what the council for financial stability will be about. It will be chaired by the Chancellor, who is ultimately accountable to Parliament, unlike some of the Opposition's proposals. Its role will not be to take binding decisions or to impose its will on an independent central bank and financial services regulator, but to work together with them to deliver financial stability objectives. I am disappointed, but not surprised, that the hon. Member for Fareham (Mr. Hoban) persists in his views. He has not explained to the House who would be in charge and what his party's policies are. I have set out in detail—at boring length in Committee—the actions that we have taken to protect depositors, the taxpayer and the financial stability of the system as a whole. The authorities have worked closely together to develop a new policy toolkit for dealing with bank failures and instability, and they have implemented often radical solutions to unprecedented difficulties while successfully avoiding a meltdown. It has been an incredible time for all those involved in the endeavour. I remain of the view that not everything has been perfect, hence some of the improvements in the Bill. We have heard the Opposition say a lot that we should get rid of the powers of the FSA and ensure that the Bank of England has them. Of course, I accept that many different institutional frameworks exist in different countries, and there is no perfect architecture. I ask the House to accept that no single model of financial regulation has been successful in fully insulating any country against the crisis. Fundamentally, my position and that of the Government is that what the regulators actually do, and the judgments that they exercise, matter as much as, if not more than, the institutional framework within which they operate.