Equality Bill

I will allow the noble Baroness, Lady Turner, out of her difficulty by explaining what my amendment is about. I have no responsibility for the grouping but I did not object, as I am delighted to be associated with her. The noble Lord, Lord Lester, joins in the fray a little later. My amendment has only a marginal connection with that of the noble Baroness. The problem is with what has happened. The Bill gives an opportunity of looking at the field that was taken up before by primary and secondary legislation. With secondary legislation there is of course no possibility of amendment except an out-and-out rejection. This is the first opportunity to look at these two matters together. This amendment was affected by the House of Commons procedures. It never got a full discussion as the click—if that is the right word—of the guillotine came down when the Member was moving it. The other place never really got to any discussion. Secondly, it is right that we should consider this amendment now. I repeat the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Alli, on his first amendment this evening: the words used in the Bill—and hitherto in the statute—are "sexual orientation". The last time I spoke on this subject I mentioned that, when the Commission originally made this proposal for the equal treatment directive, it pointed out that the discrimination factor was not sexual practice but sexual orientation. That is an important distinction. There is no reason why the provision should apply in respect of sexual practice. If it applied truly to sexual orientation alone, I would find it unobjectionable, but the fact is that, as a result of development, sexual orientation has now become associated with sexual practice. I do not see why there should be a restriction on a public authority or on organisations contracting with public authorities in that connection. It appears to me that it would be perfectly reasonable for a public authority, or an organisation that is contracted to and getting grants from a public authority, still to use its discretion in connection with matters of sexual practice. This issue was raised in connection with Catholic adoption agencies and grants. It is important to notice that, where a public authority or a contractor to a public authority is giving a service, it is the service that the public authority wants to pay for and to support. If the service is given, the mere fact that it is given in a particular religious ethos does not appear to matter, except from the point of view of choice. I do not want to reiterate the debate about Catholic adoption agencies, but one of the results was that, where a Catholic adoption agency decided to hold to the tenets under which it had previously operated, it just closed down. The result of that is only to destroy a successful, excellent service. It does not give the lesbian or gay community the slightest benefit, because the service previously offered is no longer available, but it means that a service that had success in difficult areas was closed. For my part, I cannot see the need for that. This matter goes much wider than the Catholic adoption agencies, but the same principle applies. Where a service is required and a particular group is in a position to give a good service, it should not be prohibited from taking part in a publicly funded exercise simply because it has a particular view and practice with regard to sexual practice. That is the reason for my amendment. I will not expound it at great length because it is quite simple. It is in this group because it deals with the same basic matter as the other amendments in the group.