Equality Bill

My Lords, I believe that there is a real sense in which the extent to which a society or country demonstrates its respect for conscience is a crucial criterion of the extent to which it has attained a civilised status. This is made very plain in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, whose very first article says: ""All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood"—" the last part being already pronounced by Robert Burns. Respecting conscience is not merely a matter of human rights; it is also a matter of prudence. One of the earliest speeches that I heard in this House was given by the former Lord Chief Justice, the late Lord Lane. He was a man of great experience in the law, and the criminal law in particular. In it, he spoke of the need to ensure that we should not denigrate conscience, because he recognised, rightly, that conscience plays a very important role in upholding the criminal law. As Edmund Burke once said, the less you restrain a man from within, the more you are required to restrain him from without. Failure to respect conscience is a fundamental mistake on the part of any state that aspires to be Liberal Democratic in relation to human dignity and the maintenance of law and order. Over the many years during which I have been involved in the law and the political process, people have often grumbled to me about aspects of our legal system. Until very recently I have always responded that in Britain, while there are undoubtedly matters about which people could be legitimately anxious, one could always be assured that the law would not require you to violate your conscience. In recent years, however, and certainly since 2006, this has been brought into question. I will give an example or two. At the moment, the goods and services legislation with respect to religion and belief which was introduced by the Equality Act 2006 and is recounted in the Bill before us today, puts a gay printer in a very difficult position in the event that he is approached by an evangelical or Catholic theologian who wants him to print a theology book outlining the belief that same-sex sexual practice is a sin. He cannot print the book without becoming complicit in promoting a view with which he strongly disagrees and which he may feel violates his own identity. However, under the terms of the goods and services legislation it is not clear that he could refer the theologian on to another printer. Similarly, the goods and services legislation with respect to sexual orientation introduced by regulations mandated by the 2006 Act and again referred to into the Bill—although now, I am glad to say, in amendable primary legislation—puts an evangelical or Catholic printer in a very difficult position if they are approached by a gay rights organisation and asked to print material that promotes same-sex sexual relations. Once again, the printer cannot print this material without becoming complicit in promoting something that he regards as sinful, violating his identity. The conflict between religion and belief and sexual orientation is a recurrent challenge, but we must remember that there is actually no conflict between sexual orientation and religion. There are no mainstream religious groups, certainly within the Christian tradition, that object to a person’s sexual orientation. The objection is narrowly to the practice of sex outside marriage. This matter was mentioned in a judgment of the court in Northern Ireland in connection with an application for judicial review. Mr Justice Weatherup noted that the view that same-sex sexual activity is sinful is an orthodox religious belief which is worthy of recognition in a modern democratic society. In the original proposal for a council directive in the European Community on equal treatment there is an explanatory memorandum which sets out views about the provisions in the proposal. It states: ""The discriminatory grounds referred to in paragraph 1 coincide with those laid down by Article 13 of the Treaty, with the exception of the ground of sex. With regard to sexual orientation, a clear dividing line should be drawn between sexual orientation, which is covered by this proposal, and sexual behaviour, which is not. Furthermore, it should be underlined that this proposal does not affect marital status and therefore it does not impinge upon entitlements to benefits for married couples"." The important thing is that, according to that memorandum, sexual orientation is distinct from sexual practice. The problem is around goods and services. The difficulty arises because people who have these views object to the practice, for example in their homes, of sexual relations outside marriage. That is the view which they take and, as I have just quoted, it is a fairly orthodox view which requires to be recognised in a liberal democracy nowadays. When this was discussed before, it was suggested that the person who, for example, provides bed and breakfast could not make arrangements which required non-married couples, whether same-sex or heterosexual, to use different rooms in their establishment. I am certainly very much aware of that as a difficulty in, for example, the Scottish highlands, where quite a number of people go in for bed and breakfast. They are people who really are dependent on that type of living, because not too many opportunities for alternative employment are open to them in the remoter glens of the Scottish highlands. On this particular question, if a boarding-house keeper has the arrangement that unmarried couples—whether homosexual or heterosexual—are to be accommodated in their establishment in separate rooms, is that a breach of the regulations? It is a simple question, to which I would be glad of an answer. The idea that conscience should rule in circumstances such as we are familiar with is, for example, referred to in the abortion legislation. A doctor who has a conscientious objection to performing an abortion is not obliged to do so. Even if he is with the National Health Service, he can on conscientious grounds object and refrain from doing so. I particularly stress the fact that when our nation was in great straits, conscientious objection was allowed to people who, on that ground, sought exemption from military service. That was recognised at a time of acute national distress when it meant that if one person did not go to be a combatant, somebody else would be exposed to the risks that that person escaped. That was the kind of situation, yet our country made it perfectly plain then that genuine conscientious objection was allowed. This Bill is in a unique position to deal with that problem, because the previous introductions in relation to sexual orientation, for example, were done by means of delegated or subordinate legislation and were unamendable. I welcome this Bill very much and certainly hope that it will, suitably improved, reach the statute book in good time. Yet I certainly think it right that it should be improved in this respect, by allowing individual conscience when it comes into play as a genuine conscientious conviction. It is possible to have lots of things that are not genuine, but I am talking of a genuine conscientious objection which should be allowed. That would promote the brotherhood of which Robbie Burns spoke and of which Article 1 of the human rights declaration speaks. I should probably declare a number of interests. I am an office-bearer in various Christian societies and a member of some others. I beg to move.