Equality Bill

I am putting forward the amendments to make what I consider to be a very simple amendment to replace the words "because" or "because of" wherever they arise in Clauses 13 and 14 with the words "on the grounds of". I support the arguments of the noble Baroness, Lady Warsi, in moving Amendment 21. While accepting the logic that has been put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, that if the interpretation is to be in effect the same, I shall not spend a great deal of time in going over ground that has been covered already. However, I certainly want to reaffirm the reasons for putting forward these amendments, especially in so far as the definition of direct discrimination—which includes the "on the grounds of" formulation—is common to all the domestic equality enactments. Having seen this introduced from 1965 with the first Race Relations Act, I know that it is a well established and understood concept. Indeed the relevant European directives, which domestic anti-discrimination law must implement, also use the phrase "on the grounds of". I think that we are in danger of creating confusion by changing the wording at this stage. There is a well established and legally understood legislative wording. It should not be changed unless the intention is to introduce substantive change in the meaning. If the intention is, as here, to retain exactly the same meaning and effect, the risks of changing the wording vastly outweigh any benefit to be derived from the use of plain English. In support of that I would refer to the conclusions of the Joint Committee on Human Rights in its legislative scrutiny of the Equality Bill during the 2008-09 Session. It stated: ""We consider that the previously used test in direct discrimination of ‘on the grounds of’ has acquired a clear and definite interpretation through case-law. The Government is to be applauded for its concern for attempting to ensure the definition of direct discrimination is phrased in accessible terms. However, little is gained by replacing ‘on the grounds of’ with ‘because of’. ‘On grounds of’ is both readily comprehensible and has the advantage of being a well-established term of art. Replacing this phrase with ‘because of’ risks the emergence of alternative interpretations and may undermine a clear and well-established legal position which ensures rigorous and clear protection against direct discrimination. We consider that it is strongly arguable that the definition should be amended accordingly"." I would conclude that there is an array of decisions in which the courts have interpreted "because of" more narrowly than "on the grounds of".