Bribery Bill [HL]

My Lords, there is a most distinguished league of former Attorneys-General sitting nowadays on the Conservative Benches in your Lordships’ House. They are strongly and very persuasively supported by the even more distinguished noble and learned Lord the former Lord Chancellor. But I regret to say that I am not persuaded by them. Clause 10 removes the need for consent to a prosecution to be given by the Attorney-General. However, she retains the powers of direction, which is important. This provision was agreed unanimously by the Joint Committee. Volume 1 of the report on the draft Bribery Bill makes reference to the Attorney-General. Paragraph 171 states: ""The Attorney General's powers of consent and direction raise complex constitutional issues that lie at the heart of ensuring parliamentary accountability for the criminal justice system. We agree with the Government that the power of direction should remain in place without being reformed by the draft Bribery Bill. Since this power will remain in place, we are satisfied that the power of consent should be transferred from the Attorney General to the Directors of the prosecuting authorities ... Any broader reform of the Attorney General's Office, including her power of direction, must await comprehensive proposals being pursued in the future"." As is true of all decisions of the Joint Committee, that was a unanimous decision. I see no reason why the Attorney-General should be required to consent to any prosecution for bribery, however minor the case. Bribery is not distinct from other offences. The Attorney-General does not have to give her consent to every trial for murder. It is not a matter of trust. I, too, have the utmost trust in the present Attorney-General and think that she is an outstanding holder of that office. But I do not think that that in itself is a reason for retaining her power to give consent. It is of course arguable that the Attorney-General’s power of direction should be removed as well. That, indeed, is the Attorney-General’s own view, as stated in paragraph 170, which states: ""The Attorney General acknowledged the strength of opinion on both sides over this issue. She stated her view that powers of direction were no longer necessary in view of the proposed protocol"—" that is, the protocol between her and those responsible for prosecutorial decisions. However, I accept that, as the Attorney-General said, this would be a change in the constitutional role of the office of Attorney-General, which would not be appropriate to include in this Bill. I would suggest that that reflects in no way on the behaviour of the present Attorney-General or any foreseeable behaviour by future Attorneys-General. But it seems to me that this would remove from the Attorney-General what is, frankly, an anomalous power, which is the requirement that any prosecution for bribery must receive her consent.