Bribery Bill [HL]

My Lords, noble Lords will not be surprised to learn that I feel rather strongly about this matter. Indeed, the OECD’s observation on this point just shows what is behind this idea: that someone who is intimately concerned with government cannot be trusted to decide independently matters of criminal prosecution. Our constitution has preserved that role for the Attorney-General—and in Scotland for the law officers—for longer than any of us have been familiar with it. The idea behind the amendment is that a person in government cannot properly decide a really important matter, but we are talking about a general principle that applies to all government. Politicians may wonder why people do not have more confidence in them. If politicians themselves subscribe to the idea that people in government cannot be trusted to take independent decisions, it is not surprising that the public find it possible to take that view too. It is extremely important that we preserve the role of the independent law officers who are accountable to Parliament. This has been an important part of our constitution for generations. I know that continental countries have an entirely different system, but, as the Minister said in our debate on the previous amendment, the Joint Committee felt that the examples given in support of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, were from a different system and therefore could be set aside. I suggest that we should not, in our constitutional principles, give way to the manner of handling these matters that has prevailed in some other countries. I have no doubt whatever that the Attorney-General is the proper person to account to Parliament in this very important area of the Bill. As we know, the noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General of the day did exactly that in relation to the SFO matter. One colleague in the Lords said in a debate on the planning system and on whether the decisions in planning should be taken by Ministers or by a panel that you could not trust democratically-elected people to take unpopular decisions within sight of an election. Any Government who give way to that kind of principle in the future will certainly be in a very chaotic position. I believe very strongly that we should maintain the position of the independent law officer who is associated with the Government and a member of the Government for certain matters but who on prosecution policy is completely independent of Cabinet colleagues who have no responsibility assigned to them in that matter. Perhaps I may say that I have the most profound confidence, if that is the right word, in the present Attorney-General to carry out this role efficiently. I do not believe for a minute that there is any question of her interfering with the decisions of the directors, but, being intimate to them and having responsibility for them, she is in a better position to account to Parliament for the result than she would be if she did not carry that responsibility.