Equality Bill

My Lords, as No. 37 on your list, it is quite difficult at this stage in the proceedings not to repeat things that have been said before, so I hope your Lordships’ House will forgive me if I stray into the territory that has been covered by other noble Lords, in some cases so brilliantly, today. In general, I, like many others in your Lordships’ House and outside it, support this Bill, and I hope that any remaining doubts can be overcome one way or another. It is therefore in the spirit of a critical friend that I make my brief comments today, and I look forward to working alongside noble Lords across the House to ensure that a strong, fair, effective, and indeed landmark, piece of equalities legislation is enacted. I want the Bill to become law, and swiftly, but the desire to ensure the swift passage of the Bill is tempered by the desire to ensure that we get it right. Principally, we need to ensure that the Bill has teeth, that those who break the law are dealt with accordingly, and that victims can expect to receive appropriate redress. The experience of more than 40 years of legislation in this field points to a patchy record of achievement: to some successes and some failures. However it is measured, though, we do not have an equitable and fair society at present. We are working against a backdrop of substantial social inequalities that still blight the lives of so many people in this country. In health, education, social services and other areas, this inequality manifests itself in diminished life chances and choices for older people, for people with disabilities, for black and minority ethnic people, and for people from areas of gross social deprivation in which whole communities have experienced long-term unemployment and the issues that go with it: physical and mental ill health, educational underachievement, high infant mortality rates and lower life expectancy. The Explanatory Notes state that the Bill’s two main purposes are to harmonise discrimination law and to strengthen the law to support progress on equality. Within this equalities framework, the provision of exceptions for religion seems to throw up something of an anomaly, as the noble Lords, Lord Macdonald of Tradeston, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, Lord Warner, the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, and others have pointed out. Under general exceptions in Schedule 23, a religious organisation may practise discrimination against people of the "wrong" or no religion, and services may be shaped, and indeed restricted, in ways that conform to specific religious doctrine rather than to best practice. The noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of Tradeston, mentioned schools and the education system. I know of a school at which standards continue to be seriously compromised by the reluctance of the senior management and the board to employ teachers from outside this distinctive and particular Christian group. Even other Christians are not expected to work there, and when they do they are hassled. The students have paid the price for this in low-quality and at times inappropriate teaching. Where is the rationale for prohibiting public bodies from discriminating against people on the basis of religion, but allowing religious organisations to discriminate that are sub-contracted to carry out services on their behalf? Surely high-quality public services should be accessible and open to all, whoever is supplying them, and surely the suppliers of the service should be subject to the duty to treat all service users and employees equally. The British Humanist Association and the parliamentary JCHR have expressed concerns about this exception, and I gather from what other people have said that amendments will be tabled on this matter in Committee. Like many others concerned about social deprivation and equality, I welcome the principles underlying the new public sector duty to address socio-economic disadvantage. I live in a borough in which young men on the west side of the local authority area are expected to live some seven years longer than those who live on the east side of the borough, which is at a distance of two or three kilometres. This is not an unusual situation. It is no coincidence that many of those young men failing to live up to their potential—in fact, failing to live their full lifespan—are black and all from lower-income groups. Unemployment is rife, and the educational system seems to be failing to engage these young men. All too many are NEETs—not in education, employment or training. Most of us will recognise that what is bad for these young men is bad for the whole community, and indeed for all society. However, like others, I am not entirely convinced by the wording of Clause 1(1). The public sector duty regarding socio-economic inequalities requires an authority, ""when making decisions of a strategic nature about how to exercise its functions"," to have, ""due regard to the desirability"," of using its powers to reduce inequalities. The terms "due regard" and "desirability" are imprecise terms at best, or are at least open to very wide interpretation. While it seems to be common sense that it should be left to the public bodies themselves to determine what changes they can effect in which sectors, is it right that when, ""deciding how to fulfil a duty"," these bodies are compelled to take account of guidance issued by a Minister? I find this very confusing. I am not sure how this clause will operate, what constitutes "due regard", whether in itself "due regard" is good enough anyway, and what sanctions there will be for public bodies that do not have such due regard or whose due regard is too weak for the socio-economic inequalities in the communities for which they are responsible. Furthermore, what does this ministerial guidance look like? There is an increasing awareness of the complexity of the ways in which discrimination works within our society. People do not simply experience life in one-dimensional terms, and social identities are multifaceted. Sometimes people are subjected to discrimination for more than one reason. Therefore, like many others, I welcome Clause 14, although it could be argued that it does not go far enough as it disallows cases brought on the grounds of indirect discrimination. This clause also gives Ministers the latitude to make a decision which, in effect, amends the section. Can the Minister give an example of when it might be thought necessary for a Minister to determine what a claimant needs to demonstrate to prove dual discrimination? What circumstances would need to prevail for a Minister to restrict further the circumstances in which dual discrimination is allowed in the Bill? In terms of public procurement, public bodies can make a substantial impact on equality of opportunity, especially in the job market. They are often among the largest employers in a locality. In addition, they handle billions of pounds-worth of transactions via public procurement contracts. Procurement processes offer an effective means by which public bodies can fulfil their obligation to advance equality of opportunity. By including rigorous, practical equality criteria in contracts for goods and/or services which they put out to tender, public bodies can more effectively meet the needs of all communities as well as improve equality of opportunity in employment and the job market. However, where is the incentive for public bodies to make use of this mechanism, and how will we know if this strategy for achieving equality is operating effectively? I endorse all of what my noble friend Lord Ouseley said, particularly when he was discussing the effectiveness of previous legislation in terms of public duty. This issue of it being well-written and well-articulated but proving toothless in effect is a very serious one. I hope the Government will take notice of what has been said in that area. I would like to return to something that was said by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chester earlier in the debate. He made an interesting point. He seemed to suggest that there was too much focus on the individual in terms of individual rights within the Equality Bill and in equalities frameworks generally. I wondered if he had thought about how the notion of acts such as hate crime acknowledges that a hurt—an act of violence perpetrated on one black person, or one woman, or one person with a disability, or one gay person, or one religious or non-religious person—is also an assault on the whole community. This is felt very deeply by a community. It has a disproportionate and very distressing impact on that community. That has been recognised through all sorts of landmark cases such as the Stephen Lawrence case, so I do not think it is quite as bleak as he would suggest. I conclude by saying that the importance of making this Bill an Act cannot be overestimated for those who really want to build on and strengthen previous legislation for a fairer, more equitable society. Although equalities legislation alone cannot achieve this, it serves to protect the vulnerable, has a symbolic resonance and demonstrates very clearly our society’s values and our commitment to social justice.