Equality Bill

I agree. It would be a great pity if we did not take the opportunity to tackle the problem in the Bill. I do not think that it is an ever-growing list—there are not lots of extra grounds. This is one specific ground where there is clearly potential for harm and evidence of discrimination and harassment. New clause 18 is an important new clause that would seek to define clearly in statute, and not just in case law, that discrimination against someone on the grounds of a manifestation of their sexual orientation—such as sex outside marriage, which is the only option that gay people have—is discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. That was made clear in the Amicus case, but, as we heard, there is doubt about this because the hon. Member for Forest of Dean asked that question in respect of the amendment tabled by the right hon. Member for Maidstone and The Weald. It is a live question and many organisations told us in evidence that they thought that they would be allowed to discriminate, not on the grounds of sexual orientation, which is not allowed, but on the grounds of sex outside marriage. Let us be clear that that is discrimination, because the proportion of gay people who can meet that condition is zero and the proportion of heterosexual people able to meet that condition will always be more than zero, because they can get married. That is discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. The Minister said in Committee that she agreed that it was. Making it clear in the Bill will solve all the problems of people believing that they can get away with using such behavioural conditions to get around the ban on sexual orientation discrimination. It will also prevent religion being used as a proxy for such discrimination, by someone saying that one cannot be an orthodox, or proper, member of whatever the religion is if one's private life does not comply with the requirement to have sex only inside marriage, for example. New clause 19, which is supported by the Joint Committee on Human Rights and is therefore important, asks simply that discrimination by association and perception, which is barred in case law, be expressly covered by the Bill. That would help carers and people who are perceived to be members of protected groups. On the subject raised by the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Stroud, it was useful that the hon. Member for Forest of Dean said from the Conservative Front Bench that we have to comply with the EU directive. Indeed, we were supposed to do that when we passed the 2003 employment regulations. The trade union Amicus and others took the case to the High Court, before the Bill, to argue that the exemption that we are talking about was too wide in respect of sexual orientation. Although that case was lost, the judge said that it would have to be read narrowly. A complaint was then made to the European Commission, by the National Secular Society, I believe—I declare my interest in that respect—that the 2003 regulations did not faithfully comply with the directive because the exemption they gave was wider than the exemptions envisaged in article 4(1) and (2). It is clear from what has been revealed that the Commission has found that the exemption is too wide, and requires the Government to narrow it—or perhaps it requires them to clarify the matter. If they would place the reasoned opinion in the Library, there would not be the current opacity and secrecy, and we would be able to see clearly why they do not believe that this is a narrowing. There should be no doubt that unless someone is involved in liturgy, proselytising or other activities set out in the schedule, they should be protected from discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation. It is wrong that people doing youth work who are employed by a religious organisation should be drummed out of their jobs because of their sexual orientation, or be made to be celibate.