Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Defence

I should like to start with some words that the Government would rather were not heard. I say that because they have been expunged from a statement by Sergeant Castle and a report on the death of my constituent's son, Captain James Philippson. These are Sergeant Castle's exact words:""This is—you are happy with my comments, are you?, because back Kandahar, before we deployed to Tombstone, I got given this big war pride speech off Colonel Knaggs and he said that we we'd be—you, we would not deploy on the ground unless we were fully ready to go with the equipment we require, we were going to be the—we are the main effort… Well, that was a lie. I personally got lied to by a Colonel, because that was for the whole time we were there we didn't get the equipment we asked for, there was not enough of it…it never arrived. And, sir, it was wrong. That's about it."" As I say, those words have been expunged. My constituent, Captain James Philippson, was the first soldier to be killed in action in battle, trying to rescue Sergeant Castle, whose words those were, when UK forces moved into the Taliban stronghold of Helmand. He died on 11 June 2006, while serving as part of a quick reaction force called out from Camp Bastion to rescue an injured comrade—someone who had been pinned down for over eight hours and whose patrol had been ambushed and was under sustained and heavy attack in Sangin. Before reaching their comrades, the rapid reaction unit was also ambushed, and during that attack, Captain Philippson sadly lost his life. An Army board of inquiry was subsequently convened to investigate the circumstances surrounding Captain Philippson's death, but it was not conducted correctly. However, crucially, the first Army board of inquiry uncovered issues surrounding equipment levels, such as those referred to by Sergeant Castle, in the quick reaction force that deployed, and it laid some of the blame—wrongly, as we now know—at the door of Captain Philippson's commanding officer, Major Bristow. An inquest into Captain Philippson's death was held on 15 February 2008. Following the inquest, Andrew Walker, assistant coroner for Oxfordshire, gave a verdict that""they"—" brave soldiers, fighting for us—""were defeated not by the terrorists but by the lack of basic equipment."" He also noted that""To send soldiers into a combat zone without basic equipment is unforgivable, inexcusable and a breach of trust between the soldiers and those who govern them."" Speaking to Radio 4 after the coroner's verdict, the Secretary of State for Defence, then the Minister for the Armed Forces, the right hon. Member for Coventry, North-East (Mr. Ainsworth), who is in his place, continued to stick to the line in the first Army board of inquiry—the flawed one—that""Captain Philippson was killed as a result of poor tactical decision-making, a lack of Standard Operating Procedures and a lack of equipment"." Captain Philippson's family saw that as an attempt to lay the blame with the patrol commander, Major Bristow, despite the coroner's findings that the criticisms were not founded against Major Bristow and therefore not contributory to their son's death. Captain Philippson's father, Tony, to whom I pay tribute for his dignity and strength in his fight to get to the bottom of this, and I met the Secretary of State on 18 March 2008, to seek an apology for his comments, which implicated Major Bristow and which, Tony felt,""insulted the honour and integrity of the patrol commander, the regiment and [his] son's memory"." Following the meeting on 18 March, the Secretary of State refused to retract his comments, but in letters that followed he said that the Army may look into the production of its report and its apparent procedural error in failing to allow Major Bristow, Captain Philippson's commanding officer, a proper hearing under rule 11 of the Army board of inquiry rules. I have to say that it was like pulling teeth that day, sitting there, trying to press our case. In a statement to the Press Association, an MOD spokesman said that this did not constitute a new board of inquiry or a reopening of the previous one. Despite that, in June 2008, the Secretary of State wrote to me to confirm that a second Army board of inquiry would be convened to examine the case, as the Army had identified some procedural errors in the conduct of the original investigation. He confirmed:""These include the fact that, as I confirmed in my last letter, Major Bristow was not made a 'Rule 11' witness during the original BOI"." He went on to state:""Given the procedural errors identified, the Army has decided to convene a new BOI to re-investigate the events prior to, and the circumstances surrounding, the death of Captain Philippson"." It was a huge battle to get to that stage. The Secretary of State had relied heavily on the original board of inquiry report to cast doubt on the coroner's comments about his Department's responsibility for Captain Philippson's death through a lack of equipment. He effectively allowed the reputation of Major Bristow to be dragged through the mud, and gave himself a convenient hook on which to hang his failings over lack of equipment. The report of the second board of inquiry was published last week, and rightly absolved Major Bristow of any responsibility for the incident, stating:""It is the panel's view that the command and control of the Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team was not a contributory factor in the death of Captain Philippson"." I would like to point out quote J, in the anonymised version of the report, which said:""The events of the night of 11 June 06 reflect considerable credit on those involved, especially" Major Bristow,"""who showed both tenacity and courage in persisting with his intent."" The report noted:""On 10th June 2006, Major Mackay highlighted a shortfall of firepower and night vision equipment during a presentation to the Commander International Security and Assistance Force. Major Bristow also submitted a number of requests for equipment in his Situation Reports. For example, in his report of 8th June 2006 he stated that night vision equipment was 'urgently required'; and that his main concern was 'extant Operational Mentoring And Liaison Team TEAM mission critical equipment'. He had not received any enhancements as a result of these requests prior to 11th June 2006."" The panel agreed that it was clear that""the Operational Mentoring And Liaison Team were under equipped to carry out offensive operations independently of other UK Forces and to adequately protect themselves…and this is reflected in Major Mackay's review of 2nd May 2006...in which additional equipment was requested.""The Panel is satisfied that requests for additional equipment were submitted by both Majors Mackay and Bristow. However, the Panel has not sought to examine in detail what the minimum scaling requirement should have been at the time of the incident, or what additional equipment would have been available to be allocated"." The panel also accepted that""The Quick Reaction Force did not have an infantry scaling of night vision equipment. Captain Jones estimates that they had one night vision device between four or five individuals."" The key issue is that, following Captain Philippson's death, Major Bristow made the decision to evacuate Captain Philippson's body and withdraw. The board of inquiry findings note that evacuation was challenging, arduous and dangerous, due to the weight of enemy fire. That necessitated pushing Captain Philippson's body through a narrow culvert, which could be done only after removing his body armour. Those brave deeds, which were noted on the night, mean that the second board of inquiry has absolved Captain Philippson's commanding officer of any blame for the tragic incident in which he was killed by a bullet through the head. That smear on the reputation of Major Bristow has been allowed remain for too long, and the Secretary of State has continued to use it to try to shift the blame away from the Ministry of Defence. I do not feel that that is acceptable behaviour, and I think the Secretary of State should today make a formal apology in public to Major Bristow, given the findings of the new board of inquiry. Sadly, this is not the end of things. The final version of the report of the second Army board of inquiry had three small words inserted, compared with the draft that Tony Philippson had seen and agreed to. Those three words were "lack of equipment", and their insertion, which makes the report say that lack of equipment was not contributable, means that the matter is not at an end.