Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Defence

Like the hon. Member for Walsall, North (Mr. Winnick), I want to concentrate on the war in Afghanistan—not only is it casting a long shadow over this debate, but it has cast a long shadow over this decade. We have heard a range of views expressed this afternoon. Some, from my perspective, were a good deal less compelling than those of the hon. Member for Walsall, North. I was incredibly surprised to hear the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (David Davis) suggest that even if there were a 10 or 20 per cent. chance of success—even if we were convinced that there was an 80 or 90 per cent. chance of failure—we should still stay the course and send British servicemen and women into danger's way. That is the kind of military logic that we have not heard since the charge of the Light Brigade. It is irresponsible for us to put other people's lives at stake if we believe that this might all end in failure. There are a range of views. My party would prefer to end the war, rather than extend it. However, it is vital that, whatever our views, we should have proper parliamentary accountability on the issue. The hon. Member for Walsall, North made the point that in this war, which has lasted eight years—one of the longest that we have ever had—we have never once had a vote on a substantive motion. We speak tonight on the eve of the Chilcot inquiry. One of the many scars that have been left by the Iraq war is the scar on public trust and confidence in the political process. There was an accountability gap, as public opinion was so clearly opposed to the war but unfortunately that was not reflected in the decisions made in this House. At least we had a vote on the Iraq war, however. Up to 70 per cent. of the people of this country oppose the continuation of military involvement in Afghanistan, yet we cannot even have a commitment from the Government—unless the Minister is prepared to give it tonight in his winding-up speech—that we will have an opportunity before the general election for the Government to present their strategy, for the Opposition parties to set out their stalls and for the range of alternatives that we have heard in speeches this afternoon to be put to a vote in the House. Surely the people of this country deserve that, and the servicemen and women who are fighting in Afghanistan deserve to know that there has been proper accountability on this issue, which for them is a matter of life or death. We have seen a range of different objectives—mission creep was mentioned earlier. We have ended up in a position where it would appear that the Government—I say "appear" because we have not had a succinct presentation of their strategy—have narrowed their objective to the idea of a stable, terrorist-free Afghanistan that does not threaten its neighbours. The problem with the means which the Government suggest we use to arrive at that objective is that it could create its own problems and is not sustainable, as other Members have said. The emphasis is on building up the Afghan national army and bolstering the Afghan state. We are committed to building up the army to 134,000 and the police force to 80,000. The Afghan Defence Minister and some in the United States have suggested that the Afghan security forces have to be increased to 450,000. That would make Afghanistan the most militarised country in the world, with one in every 32 men in the armed forces. It would cost $2 billion to $3 billion a year to maintain, which is about five times the annual revenue of the Government of Afghanistan. Are we really saying that we shall support that level of Afghan militarisation for the best part of half a century? If that is the Government's only strategy, it is unfortunately doomed to fail. Never mind spreading liberal democracy around the world—we are spreading illiberal democracy around the world. Even if the strategy of training up the Afghan national army is a success—though there are real questions about that—we are creating the most centralised and militarised country in the world. The Afghan constitution is completely inappropriate for a country of that kind; it is a most centralised constitution, which places almost all power in the hands of one man—the President. We now know that he is deeply corrupt, yet we ask why a patronage state has developed around him. Afghanistan is divided among 20 major ethnic groups. Within each ethnic group, there are tribes. In each tribe there are different clans, and within each clan there are different sections, yet we have concentrated power in the hands of one man but still ask why he has distributed it among his friends and family. We needed a totally different political strategy. We can already see the effects. Afghanistan is an authoritarian military state. The independent Afghan human rights commission said—I hope the Minister is listening:""Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment is common in the majority of law-enforcement institutions"," which we are propping up, and""98.5% of interviewed victims have been tortured. Institutions where torture has occurred include the police, the prosecutor's office, the security services, detention centres, prison and the army."" Clearly the political strategy is not working. The Government have to address serious issues relating to the strategy of arming the Afghan national army to the level that is projected, and concentrating power in the hands of one man. Is that really the objective we want to achieve? There is a strong argument that at some point—whether it is in 18 months, or whatever the time scale—we need to bring the military mission to a close. That does not mean that we withdraw in every sense from our responsibilities to the people of Afghanistan. We need an alternative strategy. Incidentally, I do not buy the argument about safe havens—that terrorist groups are to be found in failed states. That is sometimes the case, but sometimes it is not. Terrorist groups can be found in robust, well established states, such as Pakistan where al-Qaeda is now. Nor do I accept the argument that withdrawal from Afghanistan would necessarily destabilise Pakistan. I would turn that on its head: the presence of western forces in Afghanistan provides a propaganda tool for the Pakistan Taliban. That is what is destabilising Pakistan. During the Taliban regime, between 1996 and 2001, there was no destabilising effect on Pakistan. In fact, the ISI—the Inter-Services Intelligence—and the Pakistani Taliban worked in conjunction, as some people suggest they still do. That argument does not hold water. We need a different strategy. Other possibilities are being canvassed. We need discussions with the Taliban leadership, and not just locally: we need to speak to the shura based in Quetta, as has been suggested. The Afghan Government are about to commence negotiations with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who is part of the insurgency. If it is responsible to talk to Hekmatyar, why can we not talk to the Taliban leadership as well? A new Loya Jirga should be convened to draw up a new decentralised constitution for Afghanistan, which would properly distribute power equally among the different ethnic and regional groups, away from the hands of a corrupt President, so that people across Afghanistan could feel they had a real political stake in the future of their country, as the Foreign Secretary said. As has been suggested, that settlement could be underwritten by regional superpowers and Afghanistan's neighbours. Lastly, foreign aid could be rechannelled, away from the military mission, in return for continued local co-operation on counter-terrorism and reconstruction efforts. Members may disagree with the strategy I have presented—it is called democracy—but we desperately need the Government to present their strategy so that its success can be measured and tested over time. Other Members should present their strategy, and we should have a parliamentary vote so that those fighting in our name in Afghanistan at least know that a proper democratic process has been followed in this country.