Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Defence

I agree with the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (David Davis) about the state in which we must leave Afghanistan. Before I go on, let me pay tribute to our superb armed forces and put on the record my appreciation for what they are doing in Afghanistan, where I went many times when I was a Minister. I am committed to our presence in Afghanistan, and we must see it through and achieve the sort of outcome described by the right hon. Gentleman. However, given the political debate that has taken place recently, not least in the press, and the increasing casualties and deaths in Afghanistan in the past 12 months that have made the matter more politically difficult, I am concerned that we are not looking at it as we should. We cannot be in Afghanistan in a half-hearted way. There must be 100 per cent. political will from this Government, from all the parties and from our NATO allies to see the matter through to its conclusion. I am concerned about some of the language used in recent months, to which I shall come in a minute. The right hon. and learned Member for Kensington and Chelsea (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) was also right—I agreed with most of his speech—that a myth has developed that, because of Afghanistan's history, no one can ever succeed there. Actually, people have succeeded at different times, and there has been stability at different times, but it has always been a difficult place. Why is Afghanistan important, and why has there been so much foreign intervention there over the years? Afghanistan is important because of where it sits in the world. Often, easy points are made by people who do not know all the facts, but who try to manipulate them to fit their own conclusions. As has been said, NATO cannot afford to lose in Afghanistan—its credibility is on the line. Some people peddle the idea that because al-Qaeda was driven out of Afghanistan into the border areas of Pakistan and the mountains, there is no point in our being in Afghanistan now. Do we think for one moment that al-Qaeda would not come back into Afghanistan if NATO withdrew? The whole border area is difficult in any case, and we cannot have one solution without the other: we must have a solution in Pakistan and a solution in Afghanistan. The defeat of the insurgents in Pakistan is crucial, because the fundamentalists must not be allowed to win there. That involves great difficulties, because Pakistan has nuclear weapons. I do not know how close the insurgents have come, or could come, to toppling the Pakistan Government, but if they did, it would cause a major problem. What would India's reaction be in such circumstances? There are many other scenarios to be discussed in the context of the importance of Afghanistan, not all of which relate to Pakistan. I have read a great many books in the past 12 months, some of them better than others. It seems from a book by Colonel Stuart Tootal—a fine officer and soldier—that after we had sent in 3,000 troops, they were sent all over Helmand following demands from the Afghan Government and the governor. What followed was what can only be described as the debacle of Musa Qala. At one point, we very nearly withdrew. I believe that that was due to a number of factors. I am sure that the advice given to Ministers by the chiefs of staff, the Foreign Office and others was that it was necessary at the time, but they probably did not envisage that the troops would be dragged all over Helmand province trying to deal with various outbreaks of insurgency, or anticipate the problems to which those outbreaks led. The argument that there were not enough troops in the first place is, in my view, unassailable. I have always argued that there ought to be more troops, and we have put more troops in. I want to make what I consider to be an important point about NATO's contribution, and I shall do so shortly, but first I want to deal with stories in the press suggesting that we might withdraw from part of Helmand into the most populated areas. That would be a major mistake. We need boots on the ground. Our troops should be working among the people, providing protection and security and allowing development to take place. The idea that we should do that only in certain areas of Helmand is farcical. I do not see how it could logically be achieved, and I do not know whether it is being seriously considered.