Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and Defence

My hon. Friend is absolutely right, and the question is how we achieve that. If we have a full-frontal diplomatic assault, along the lines President Obama heard about, I do not think it will succeed. We need to look for behind-the-scenes reassurances, confidence-building measures and that sort of approach in order gradually to begin to change the dynamics. The Foreign Secretary does not have a brilliant track record with the Indian media, so I will not ask him or his colleagues in answering the debate to reveal whether any particular diplomacy is under way, but the House needs to know that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office is making this matter a priority. We need to know that real work is going on on this issue, and that the FCO is not just sitting back because it is all too difficult. Our troops are on the front line, so this is absolutely central. Beyond Pakistan, part of the challenge of finding a regional peace solution is the deep history of distrust in the region—whether one speaks of Iran, Saudi Arabia, central Asian concerns or Russian fears—because if we are to bring the fighting to an end and achieve a sustainable peace, the regional political element needs to be developed and our Foreign Office needs to be engaged in that. For the Liberal Democrats, the most critical test of any new political strategy is how it addresses the local dimension and the insurgents on the ground. There are three elements to this, the first of which is the self-evident need to promote the social and economic well-being of ordinary Afghans, who have to see that a non-Taliban future is possible and prosperous. Reconstruction and development is not contentious in itself; the concern throughout the House has been the apparent inability to deliver, which remains a concern. The second element is local governance. Most of Afghanistan's 153 municipalities lack basic justice systems, let alone other services. Of Afghanistan's 4,000-odd villages, there is no governmental system beyond the tribal leaders. Yet the current Afghan system of government still directs almost all resources via Kabul, and nothing direct to the provincial or local level. Our country, with its strong centralising tendencies, is probably not in a good place to advise on this, but we really need to change that government structure in Afghanistan. The third element of this local political piece is the critical need to talk to the Taliban. I was roundly condemned earlier this year for arguing that it was "time to take tea" with the Taliban, yet I am of the firm belief that this remains the right thing to do. To avoid misunderstanding, let me explain precisely what I mean— not least because I think I may differ a little in detail from the Government on the issue of what "talking to the Taliban" means. I think it is shared territory that the Taliban are not some homogenous political grouping. As many others have said, they consist of the jihadists and the moderates—of those who take orders from either Mullah Omar or Haqqani, or those who obey their local tribal commanders; of the foreign Taliban and the Afghan Taliban; of the $10 a day Taliban and the Pashtun nationalists—so talking to the Taliban can mean many things in practice. There are some who suggest talking to the Taliban leadership, by which they tend to mean Mullah Omar. I have nothing in principle against that, yet unless we think they think they are losing, I do not think this will work. As many have said, they will believe that they have time on their side. I have been more impressed by those experts who have argued for talking to the local Taliban—the local insurgents. Like others, no doubt, I have been influenced by an article called "Flipping the Taliban" in this summer's Foreign Affairs, by regional and Taliban experts Fotini Christia and Michael Semple, who made the argument for grass-roots, village-by-village, tea-drinking diplomacy. I have since been confirmed in that view by a separate but equally excellent article written by the hon. Member for Gravesham (Mr. Holloway). I apologise to him if my endorsement in any way blights his promising career. In a passage sub-headed "Drinking tea can greatly reduce violence", he writes as follows:""One remarkable individual told me that a decent political officer, with the right support, a generous budget and plenty of time to drink tea with commanders and tribal elders, could reduce the violence in Helmand by up to 70 per cent. This is no vainglorious speculation: that sort of approach has worked before, when the British Empire had dedicated Political Officers in the region. It can work again—if there is the political will."" Let us be absolutely clear: both articles are deeply realistic, and both understand the risks and the dangers all too well. Neither is putting forward tea drinking as a simplistic, glib, easy-to-do solution that would allow the military to pack up and go home. Both recognise that the best way to defeat the ideological Taliban is to win defectors from their own fighters, and that the best way to "Afghanise" the Afghan forces is to reintegrate former insurgents into the cause of law and order. Both appreciate that it is by understanding the issues of individual Taliban commanders that bribes, assurances and legitimate authority can best be bestowed in the cause of peace.