Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill

Off the top of my head, I cannot guarantee that, but I will endeavour to get a response to the hon. Gentleman before I finish speaking; alternatively, I will write to him. After two years, a former CAG must take advice from a person nominated by the Public Accounts Commission before taking up other employment of a kind specified by the commission. If amendment 31 is approved, the two-year ban will be removed. The effect of that will be to impose, through subsections (5) and (6), a lifetime restriction on public sector employment for a former CAG. The commission originally recommended that a former CAG should not be eligible at all to take up other employment in the public sector after their term of office. It later recommended a five-year ban. As was said by the Father of the House, the legal advice cautioned there was a real risk that a permanent ban on public sector employment would be found indirectly discriminatory on age grounds. The Government accept the importance of the CAG's independence, but we think that any restraints on future employment must be proportionate and within the law. A lifetime ban goes much further than what is required to protect the CAG's independence since it is hard to believe that a serving CAG could be influenced in any real sense while in office by a distant and, by its nature, highly uncertain prospect of remunerated work. Moreover, such a ban is likely to deter candidates, particularly younger ones, from applying for the post of CAG, which is not in anyone's interests. As I have said, there is a real risk that a permanent ban on public sector employment would be found indirectly discriminatory on age grounds. Moreover, if such an infringement were found, it is unlikely that it could be defended as being reasonably necessary and objectively justifiable. A lifetime ban is therefore neither necessary nor desirable. On amendments 29 and 30, the 15th report of the Public Accounts Commission recommended a lifetime ban on former CAGs accepting any post in any body that the National Audit Office has audited or which is in the gift of Government. It was in this context that the commission considered that some conflicts of interest could arise over posts in the private sector with, for example, defence contractors or other suppliers to the public sector. The commission therefore recommended that the CAG should consult what has been called the "Advisory Committee on Public Appointments". In fact, the correct title of the body is the Advisory Committee on Business Appointments. Subsection (2) allows the Public Accounts Commission to nominate a person to advise former CAGs on taking up future offices or appointments. The advantage of the current drafting is that it allows the Public Accounts Commission to decide which person to consult depending on the circumstances at the time. It is therefore capable of adapting to future changes, for example should the name or responsibilities of the adviser change. That advantage should be obvious to Members already since, in attempting to be more specific, the amendment names a body that does not exist. There would, of course, be nothing to stop the commission specifying that the advice should be taken from the chair of the advisory committee if it so wished. Turning briefly to Amendment 30, if subsection (3) were to be deleted, as proposed, not only would the Public Accounts Commission be unable to specify the adviser, but it would be unable to specify the description of offices, positions, agreements or arrangements. Therefore, a side effect of the amendment would be to create uncertainty about which positions are covered by subsection (2). With that explanation, I hope the hon. Member for Cambridge (David Howarth) will consider withdrawing his amendment.