Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill

As we have established this afternoon, the office of the Comptroller and Auditor General was set up to hold Government to account. We have legislation that enshrines in law a requirement to ensure that the Comptroller and Auditor General is, and is seen to be, independent of any and all outside influence, particularly that of the Executive. The arrangements for appointment, remuneration and removal from office in the national audit provisions of the Bill are intended to ensure that external considerations cannot influence the judgments that the Comptroller and Auditor General needs to make in scrutinising the Government's use of public resources on behalf of the House of Commons. That sets clause 42 in context. Let me now turn to the amendments, beginning with amendment 31. Clause 37, to which the Committee agreed earlier, limits the Comptroller and Auditor General's term of office to a maximum 10-year single term. It is likely, therefore, that a Comptroller and Auditor General could have a lengthy working life once he had left office. Mindful of that, the Government have put in place measures to ensure that the hope of future employment could not influence a Comptroller and Auditor General's judgments while in office. That consideration was also important to the Public Accounts Commission, from whose proposals the provision derives. The CAG needs to focus all his efforts on carrying out his role without fear or favour right through to the end. Clause 42 therefore restricts a former CAG from working for the Crown or providing services to persons acting on behalf of the Crown for a period of two years after they cease to be CAG.