Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill

It is indeed important that we have had this debate and put that on record. Of course, the Public Accounts Commission took evidence from Professor Heald and disagreed with him. The CAG will continue to have complete independence. The recruitment of the chair is intended to enable the appointment of a strong adviser to support and challenge the CAG, but it will not be the job of the chair to hold the CAG to account. That, of course, is the job of the commission. The clause ensures that the CAG will continue to be independent of outside influence and interference, as is currently enshrined in the National Audit Act 1983, the relevant provisions of which the clause reproduces. As the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee, the hon. Member for Gainsborough (Mr. Leigh), mentioned, schedule 7 provides that the NAO and the CAG should jointly prepare a strategy for the approval of the commission. That strategy is to set out the national audit functions, a plan for the use of resources and a maximum amount of resources to be provided by the NAO in a particular financial year. It is for the CAG to decide what resources are needed for his core statutory functions, and the NAO has to provide him with those resources. The hon. Gentleman also mentioned the fact that the relationship between the NAO and the CAG will be set out in a code of practice, which must be approved by the commission. We have had a useful debate, and we have all managed to get on record the importance of the complete discretion and independence of the CAG. Question put and agreed to. Clause 38 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.