Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill

Clause 38 deals with the status of the Comptroller and Auditor General. Subsection (8) highlights and signposts the provisions in clause 43 and schedule 6, and in clause 44 and schedule 7. It may be helpful to the Committee and reduce the time that we need to debate subsequent points if we address some concerns that have been expressed about the new governance structure. Those concerns have been raised in particular by Professor David Heald, who is a former adviser to the Public Accounts Commission. Perhaps, in the spirit of the hon. Member for Luton, North (Kelvin Hopkins), I can provoke a debate. Professor Heald's concern is that the role of Parliament may well be diminished by the creation of the NAO board. In an article he stated:""This insertion of the NAO Board between the Public Accounts Commission and the CaAG creates dangers. Governments might use the chair and board as a means of curtailing the activities of the comptroller, particularly in the more judgmental value for money sphere and in relation to the outsourcing of audit work."" His concern is that that body will have some influence on the CAG. The Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee made it clear how important it is that there is independence for the CAG and how important, therefore, the appointment structure is. There is a role for the NAO in the approval of strategy and in the provision of resources. The concern is whether the Executive, through the chair of the NAO board, could influence the CAG. The other concern is that if the chairman of the NAO board is strong, there is a risk of interference. If he or she is weak, what is the point? Is this merely a distraction of management effort—of effort by the CAG—that could otherwise be focused on other things? I hope it is helpful to the Committee for me to put those concerns on the record and give the Chairman of the Public Accounts Committee an opportunity to respond, although in some respects he addressed those concerns in his earlier remarks.