Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill

I can only say to the hon. Gentleman that, as I said just now, further work is ongoing on what we can introduce. We want to be more transparent and to have a better way of ensuring that we can look at our spending plans, our estimates and the expenditure outcome. We all agree, of course, that it is important that Parliament should continue to play an active role in scrutinising the expenditure of public money, but we do not think that a declaratory provision of the type envisaged in the proposed new clause accurately reflects the purpose of the provisions. On amendment 68, the national audit responsibilities of the Comptroller and Auditor General are already set out in legislation, and within those responsibilities some matters are left to the Comptroller and Auditor General's judgment and discretion, such as whether to carry out a value-for-money examination into a particular subject. That is consistent with his independent role in holding the Government to account. Part 7 of and schedule 7 to the Bill already draw an important distinction between the services to be provided by the Comptroller and Auditor General. The resources available to the Comptroller and Auditor General fall into two categories, those whose allocation is at the sole discretion of the Comptroller and Auditor General and those for additional but important services, which require National Audit Office approval. We do not consider it to be necessary or desirable to impose any further restriction on the way in which the Comptroller and Auditor General and the NAO choose to exercise discretion on the use of resources by suggesting that one function should be elevated to the status of a principal function. We consider that, while all the work carried out by the Comptroller and Auditor General is important, the provisions relating to the use of resources give a clear indication of where the Comptroller and Auditor General's priorities lie. Beyond that, it is for the Comptroller and Auditor General and the National Audit Office, within the framework established by the Bill, to establish priorities. That is consistent with the independence of their roles. Before I move on to discuss amendment 78, the hon. Member for Ludlow asked me a direct question about what would happen if the NAO chair did not get on with the Comptroller and Auditor General. It is right that it is for the Prime Minister and the Chair of the Public Accounts Committee alone formally to make the appointment. The NAO chair would serve only in an advisory capacity and he would not be the one who was making the final decision.