Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill

I hope that I am not giving away any confidences by saying that Amyas Morse told me this week that it can be a very lonely job—and, as I have described it, a very important one—and he welcomes the advice of the chairman of the board, Sir Andrew Likierman. The Comptroller and Auditor General can go to him in confidence at any time and ask for his support and advice. However, the arrangement is unique: although Sir Andrew Likierman can give his advice, the buck ultimately stops with the Comptroller and Auditor General. The Comptroller and Auditor General has a large staff of 800 people who help him to write reports, but he puts his signature on the document, and it is his document and his alone. The board will be involved, for instance, in appointments, such as deciding who should be deputy Comptroller and Auditor General, what the travel arrangements of the Comptroller and Auditor General should be, and what should be the size of the staff. It was wrong that, under the previous incarnation of Sir John Bourn, who was a fine public servant, the Comptroller and Auditor General was a complete dictator—that was always the case; Sir John did not change anything in that regard. He not only had complete independence on his audit judgment, which is right, but appointed all the deputy Comptroller and Auditor Generals, decided the travel arrangements and everything else. In the modern world, one cannot go down that route. One must have a modern corporate structure, involving a board, as long as the board does not tell the Comptroller and Auditor General what to do in relation to his audit judgments.