Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman and if he will bear with me, I shall come to that point as I proceed through all the advantages of the schedule. Obviously, if he has written to the Lord Chancellor, I am sure that he will receive a full and completely adequate reply in a timely fashion. Paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 9 of schedule 5 remove the Prime Minister from the appointment process of the president, deputy president and judges of the Supreme Court. Paragraph 2 amends section 26 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, with the effect that when presented with a candidate chosen by a selection commission recommendations for appointment will now be made by the Lord Chancellor instead of by the Prime Minister. Instead of notifying a selection to the Prime Minister, the Lord Chancellor is to make a recommendation for appointment. Paragraphs 3, 4 and 9 make various consequential amendments to the 2005 Act. Although we accept that the Executive need to retain a limited role in the appointment of the justices of the Supreme Court, so that there is a direct line of accountability to Parliament for such appointments, the Government believe that, as with all other judicial appointments, the Lord Chancellor has the necessary authority to fulfil this role. Involving the Prime Minister in addition to the Lord Chancellor at a point twice removed from the work done by the independent selection commission that is convened to recommend appointments to the Lord Chancellor in the first place only serves to perpetuate an erroneous perception that the appointment process is not as independent from the Executive as it should be. For that reason, the Government believe that even though the Prime Minister's role in recommending the final nomination to the Queen is a limited one, removing that role is very much in line with the Government's long-standing reform agenda of reducing the role of the Executive, where appropriate, wherever possible. Paragraphs 5 and 6 of the schedule transfer responsibility for obtaining medical assessments of selected candidates for judicial office from the Judicial Appointments Commission to the Lord Chancellor. That is supported by the commission because it sees the process of medical assessment as part of the final appointment process, rather than the initial selection process. In addition, there was consensus in consultation that this aspect of the appointment process should be quicker—and so there is general agreement with the burden of the appraisal made by the hon. Member for Crewe and Nantwich (Mr. Timpson), which is that it has taken too long.