Policing and Crime Bill

My Lords, I support the retention of Clause 14 because it begins to put the responsibility for prostitution onto the man who chooses to buy sex instead of on a seller who, because of exploitation, has no choice. Some people are concerned about the strict liability element of the clause and it has been claimed that there are no current examples of strict liability in similar offences in UK law. However, there are cases where strict liability has been employed; for example, in Section 5 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, which makes it an offence to have sex with a child under the age of 13, regardless of whether it can be proved that the offender knew that the child was under age or whether the child consented to the sexual activity. This is in place because of the abhorrent harm inflicted through child sexual abuse. Secondly, Section 4 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 makes it an offence to drive or attempt to drive under the influence of drugs or alcohol, regardless of whether the driver is aware of this. It is important to consider how effective Clause 14 would be without a strict liability element. The answer is to be found in Finland. The Finnish Parliament voted in June 2006 to pass legislation that criminalises the buying of sexual services from a victim of human trafficking or from someone who is a victim of procurement. In order successfully to prosecute a buyer of sexual services, evidence has to be provided that the man in question knew that he had purchased and sexually exploited a woman who was a victim of trafficking in human beings or who was under the control of a pimp. Due to the difficulty of enforcing the legislation, no convictions were secured until January of this year, when 16 people were convicted. Fourteen of the convictions related to the case of a severely mentally disabled young Estonian woman. The other two convictions related to a young Finnish girl who was held in a basement on the Russian/Finnish border. The nature of these cases makes it evident that unless the burden of proof is on the accused, it is almost impossible to obtain convictions. Would-be exploiters know this, and the law is, therefore, of very little deterrence. We know that a significant number of women in the sex trade are subjected to physical violence and rape, and are exploited by a third party. Such women are powerless to do anything about it. By contrast, the person who pays for sexual services does have a choice. If Clause 14 is passed, he will know in advance that he must satisfy himself that he has reasonable proof that the woman is not controlled for gain by a third person. If he has no such proof, he must desist or run the risk of prosecution under Clause 14. He has that choice. That is what strict liability means in practice in those circumstances. I can see absolutely no injustice in this. To avoid any risk of conviction, the person intending to pay for sex should assume that the person he is about to pay is controlled by a third person and, therefore that he commits an offence for which he may be convicted. Thus, in practice, the benefit of doubt is given to the person who is in danger—the one who is powerless; the one who may have no choice. That is as it ought to be. Put another way, a man who wants to pay for sexual services must make sure that the person he is to pay is not being exploited by a third party. If he cannot be sure, he risks conviction. That is the message of Clause 14, and it is a message that this House should send loud and clear, because it is designed to protect those who most need the law’s protection. We need to do all we can to protect women and children who are subjected to commercial sexual exploitation. We must take this step to reduce exploitative prostitution and protect those who are currently unable to protect themselves. The human trafficking trade in the world is worth $44 billion. We must do something to reduce that.