Policing and Crime Bill

My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 152AW and 152AZ. I begin by repeating the declaration that I made at Second Reading, of being a vice-president of the Association of Police Authorities and a member of the Metropolitan Police Authority. In that latter capacity, I have been involved in the oversight of the discussions about policing with Heathrow Airport as well as with the non-designated London City Airport, which have been protracted and so far unsatisfactory in their outcome. The amendments deal essentially with two issues; first, to establish which Secretary of State will arbitrate disputes about airport security plans. I acknowledge at once that it is of course the convention that Secretaries of State are indivisible and that the Government are absolutely seamless and work wonderfully together, but the purpose of the amendment is to clarify who will have the lead on these matters. I also want to establish what time limits should apply to settling arbitration disputes. The first issue is who will arbitrate in practice. This section of the Bill comprises amendments to the Aviation Security Act 1982, which is obviously a Department for Transport Act, and would imply that the Secretary of State for Transport is the relevant Secretary of State. However, the Bill is also a Home Office Bill, dealing with matters of security and policing at airports, which would imply that the Home Secretary is intended. This is made worse by Schedule 6, which deals specifically with policing plans at airports. It contains similar provisions about arbitrating disputes where policing plans are not agreed. Again, the same doubts apply in relation to which Secretary of State is intended to be the arbiter. Aside from these technical points, there may be a difference in the way in which the two Secretaries of State might view disputes. The Home Secretary, being familiar with national security threats, might place more emphasis on that side of the equation, whereas the Department for Transport, being more familiar with the concerns of airport operators, might place more emphasis on commercial considerations, which is precisely the issue that we have been discussing in the past couple of groups of amendments. This has raised some concern that profitability might be put before security—I note the assurance that my noble friend has already given on that point. When it comes to arbitrating disagreements about airport security plans and airport policing plans, I trust that what we will see is the very closest working together between the two government departments. It is in no one’s interest to drive airports into bankruptcy, but it is particularly important to ensure that security is not compromised or suffers in difficult financial times. That means that there should be clarity about what airport operators are paying for, and that should relate to those national security matters. I hope that my noble friend will offer some reassurance that the statutory guidance to be issued following Royal Assent will include clear mention of the Secretary of State for Home Affairs being involved. I would also hope for my noble friend’s confirmation that such reassurance will be within the guidance issued, that, if the Secretary of State for Transport has the lead, they should be obliged to act in accordance with it in all applicable cases, and that the paramount importance of security in such cases will be uppermost in their mind. The second issue in this group of amendments is whether time limits should apply in relation to determining arbitration decisions. We heard much in the Committee’s debates on earlier groupings about who has an incentive to put costs up and who has an incentive to reduce them. Equally, there is an incentive for some to allow these decisions to spin out for as long as possible. If you are currently not paying something, then not doing so until 2011, 2012, 2013 or 2014 seems much better than having to pay it now. So the issue of time limits is critical. The concern here is that a decision could, as the Bill’s wording stands, be allowed to drift indefinitely. That would mean that police authorities and forces could effectively be out of pocket for some months or even years before being reimbursed for delivery of policing services. Although this would be alleviated by interim payments where agreements already exist, it could prove problematic where they do not. In difficult economic times, this might in extreme situations threaten the policing presence at airports, if money cannot be found elsewhere in the police budget to tide them over until agreement is reached. Perhaps more serious, because it is probably more likely, is a situation where the dispute is about who should contribute which services to the security plan. This could lead to prolonged uncertainty and incomplete security cover in some respects. It is clear that that a prolonged arbitration process in these circumstances would add to an already significant risk. Any absence of clarity in these matters could lead to confusion and potentially very serious consequences. It also makes forward planning and budgeting resources almost impossible if a dispute continues indefinitely. I appreciate the difficulty in setting a single timescale for all possible disputes and I am not sure that three months is necessarily the right length of time—I am willing to be persuaded that it might be, let us say, four months as opposed to three—but I have included it for the sake of debate. I should be interested in my noble friend’s views on what would be an acceptable length of time and how decision-making within a sensible time limit can be guaranteed. I beg to move.