Policing and Crime Bill

These amendments relate to the new powers of seizure and detention that we are seeking to introduce into the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. The powers will prevent the dissipation of or reduction in the value of property that may then be used in settling a future confiscation order. These are important additions, as they will add to the effective enforcement of confiscation orders once they are made. This is an important point: orders must be not only made but enforced. I do not pretend that they are minor powers, as the noble Baroness said, and in recognition of this, your Lordships will note that many safeguards are attached to them to ensure their proportionate and focused use. One of the safeguards is that of various stages of judicial oversight. These amendments address that issue. They are concerned with the appropriate courts for authorising use of the search and seizure powers, making an order for further detention of the seized property and dealing with appeals. The new provisions in the Bill are modelled on the cash search, seizure, detention and forfeiture provisions in POCA. We are not therefore breaking new ground here by giving the magistrates’ court jurisdiction to provide authorisation for the use of search powers or to conduct detention order hearings. Similar issues that occur in the cash proceedings are likely to be raised under these new powers. It is also relevant that the magistrates’ court is the enforcement authority for the purposes of confiscation orders under Section 35 of POCA. Issues relating to property and other matters that arise from confiscation orders have been before the magistrates’ court since the enforcement powers under Section 35 were commenced in 2003. We believe that magistrates’ courts are properly equipped to deal with the search and seizure powers and detention order cases. Under Section 290 of POCA, a JP provides prior approval for the use of the powers to search for cash. In circumstances where it is not practicable to obtain this, a senior officer can provide the prior approval. We base the appropriate approval provision in these new powers on that established and successful precedent. It is also of note that, if no judicial approval was obtained for the use of the powers and if no property is seized or any seized property is not detained for more than 48 hours, an officer must send a report to the independent person I talked about in my previous response. The report to the appointed person must detail why the officer believed that the powers were exercisable and why it was not practicable to obtain the approval of a JP. In cases where property is retained for more than 48 hours, it will be subject to judicial oversight by way of an application to a court for its continued detention. Due to the immediacy of some situations where an officer wants to use the powers to search for and seize property, it may be that a senior officer is available at the scene or is easily contactable. It would be fatal to the use of the powers if during an actual operation an officer had to obtain JP approval for their use. The immediacy of the moment would be lost and the property possibly dissipated. The alternative of a senior officer providing approval still provides for oversight. It is important to note that, if senior officer prior approval has been obtained but property is not seized or not detained for more than 48 hours, a report has to be made, as I have outlined. As regards detention hearings in those cases where property is subject to a restraint order, the further detention of that property after its initial seizure has to be authorised by the Crown Court. Cases that involve property of higher value or are complex are more likely to be subject to a restraint order. The use of restraint orders is increasing; their number has risen from 1,356 in 2007-08 to an estimated 1,664 in 2008-09. It is unlikely that a Crown Court restraint order would be sought in lower-value and simpler cases where smaller items of personal property may have been seized. In those cases, the application to further detain the property is made to the magistrates’ court. We do not consider that it would be an appropriate use of the Crown Court’s time to deal with such lower-order cases given the other business pressures that it continually faces. There is, however, an express right of appeal to the Crown Court against a decision of the magistrates’ court not to grant an application to vary or discharge a detention order. I remain convinced that the Government’s proposals in this respect are reasonable and proportionate and ask that the amendment be withdrawn.