Policing and Crime Bill

My Lords, Amendment 134 and the other amendments in this grouping would remove the ability of the court to include positive requirements in an injunction and would limit injunctions to prohibitive measures. Requirements form a key component of these provisions. I have made the point previously, but it is important with regard to this amendment so I will make it again. This tool is not just about protecting communities—although clearly that is a very important part of it—through the effective prevention of serious crime but, exactly as the noble Baroness, Lady Walmsley, says, about engaging individuals to persuade them to change their behaviour. I know that a number of noble Lords have raised concerns about these requirements. Examples of requirements that could be ordered include notifying the applicant of a change of address, a curfew or participation in particular activities. The types of activities that we envisage respondents being required to participate in include community call-in or mentoring sessions, and these types of activities will give authorities and community leaders the opportunity to engage with gang members, explaining the effects of gang-related violence in their area and offering them opportunities to learn, develop and exit the gang lifestyle. Removing the ability of the courts to place positive requirements on individuals would be a missed opportunity to engage positively with young people and would therefore limit the effectiveness of these provisions. I therefore must resist Amendment 134 and its related amendments. Amendment 142A would remove Clause 35(6). I will quickly run through the purpose of this subsection. At present, the court has the power to attach the power of arrest to any provision of an injunction except where specifically excluded. Clause 35(6) makes it explicit that the court may limit the power of arrest to a period that is shorter than the provision to which it is attached. For example, the court may apply a curfew for a period of 12 weeks but attach the power of arrest for only six. The purpose of this is that in times of heightened gang tension, it will be important for enforcement authorities to deal with breaches swiftly, so the power of arrest is necessary. However, the court might also consider that a curfew will be necessary in the medium-to-long term to give local authorities and police the breathing space needed to ease tensions between rival gangs and to prosecute where offences have been committed. However, because it is expected that the situation will have calmed, if a breach is suspected the court may consider it more appropriate for the applicant to apply for a warrant where it is serious, or to start committal proceedings for contempt of court. Although I do not expect this subsection to be exercised as a matter of course, it affords the courts a degree of flexibility that will enable them to tailor the power of arrest to where it is necessary or suitable. We do not want to limit the court’s flexibility in this regard. Amendment 146 seeks to remove Clause 40(1). This clause makes specific provision with regard to interim injunctions that can be granted when an application without notice, made under Clause 38, is adjourned. Again, I know that Members have concerns about these "without notice" injunctions, so it might help if I set out in a little detail why these provisions are necessary to prevent gang-related violence on the ground. Clause 38, which allows such an application to be made, is necessary as the police can receive intelligence that a retaliation attack may occur, sometimes within 24 hours. By allowing the applicant local authority or police force to obtain an interim injunction without giving notice to the respondent, that retaliation attack can be prevented swiftly and effectively. If authorities had to give notice in these scenarios, the respondent could take evasive action, making the injunction unenforceable. The purpose of Clause 40 is to put in place some additional safeguards to take into account the fact that the respondent would not be present, or indeed aware, that proceedings were taking place. First, the court must consider it necessary, rather than just and convenient, to grant an injunction. This makes it clear that, if at all possible, the application should be made on notice to the respondent. The Government consider that it would be unfair for an interim injunction made in these circumstances to include prohibitions or requirements to be in force until further order, or to have the effect of requiring the respondent to participate in particular activities. These conditions should be put in place only once the respondent has been afforded the opportunity to make their case to the court and have therefore been specifically excluded from the without notice interim injunction. Clauses 38 and 40 are absolutely necessary to allow the use of injunctions as a preventative tool. I would therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.