UK Parliament / Open data

Parliamentary Standards Bill

I certainly have some sympathy with the submission of the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Alloway. After all, we are a reviewing Chamber, and we are reviewing one of the most important pieces of legislation ever to have come our way. Whether we like it or not, and whether or not we feel embarrassment in relation to a matter which is exclusively—at this stage, at any rate—referable only to the House of Commons, we have that overarching duty which, with the very greatest respect, we simply cannot avoid. The first question is whether it was necessary to create a third offence at all. Certainly Parliament should always balk at creating an offence that applies only to a very narrow constituency of people—in this case, 665 or 670 Members or thereabouts—unless it is absolutely necessary. The offence of falsification of accounts under Section 17 of the Theft Act 1968 certainly covers this amply, and an offence under Section 2 of the Fraud Act 2006, which double-banks considerably Section 17 of the Theft Act but goes a little wider, also covers it totally. Therefore, it seems that there never was a case for a third offence. The defence put forward by the Government is that in relation to the offences under the Theft Act and Fraud Act it was necessary to prove dishonesty. Under Clause 8, it is necessary to show that a Member has made a claim and provided information for the purposes of the claim knowing that information to be, ""false or misleading in a material respect"." However, how can that fail to be dishonesty? That is the first and fundamental question. The next question is: if I am wrong as a matter of technicality, does it make any difference at all? The test of dishonesty was laid down by the Court of Appeal in R v Ghosh about 25 years ago. A jury has to decide two questions. First, is the conduct that has been proven such that an ordinary, honest, decent citizen would regard it as dishonest? If the answer is yes, then there is a second question; if the answer is no, then of course the charge falls there and then. However, if the answer is yes, the next question is: did the defendant appreciate that he was doing wrong and acting dishonestly in accordance with that standard—not his own standard but the standard of an ordinary, honest, decent person? Even if one were not to insert the word "dishonesty" in the offence or to regard dishonesty as being specifically necessary for the commission of the offence, I fail to see how it would make any real difference regarding the issues that would have to be determined as matters of fact by an ordinary, reasonable jury. I have the gravest doubt myself. Secondly, there is the question of punishment. Even if the Government managed to get over the first hurdle of whether a third offence was necessary here, how can there be any justification for the sanctions being so out of kilter with those that apply to ordinary British citizens? Those citizens are subject to a maximum 10-year penalty under the Fraud Act and a seven-year penalty under Section 17 of the Theft Act. The message that will go out to the public if this provision remains worded as it is today is that a soft option has deliberately been created in the interests of Members of Parliament, who will have a maximum penalty one-seventh or one-tenth of that of the ordinary citizen. There is an absence of logic in saying that a third offence has been created to make it easier to prosecute Members of Parliament. That is the Government’s case. They say that by not referring to dishonesty, you make them more vulnerable to prosecution. What is the sense, then, in saying that they are less vulnerable to sanction?
Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
712 c1275-6 
Session
2008-09
Chamber / Committee
House of Lords chamber
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