Policing and Crime Bill

I support this amendment for all the reasons that have been given by the noble Baroness and, very simply and very briefly, on the basis of the facts of a case that is well known to any lawyers that are here present; I think that two other lawyers are here present. I refer to a case known as Sweet v Parsley (1970) AC 132. The facts were that the defendant let out rooms in a farmhouse. Some of her tenants smoked cannabis. It was accepted by the prosecution that she did not know that fact. She was convicted of managing premises used for the purpose of smoking cannabis on the ground that the offence was an absolute one and that it was therefore unnecessary to prove knowledge. She did, in fact, manage the premises. The premises were, in fact, used for smoking cannabis and therefore that was thought to be sufficient for her conviction. When her case reached the House of Lords, her appeal was allowed. I want to quote only two sentences from the speech of Lord Reid—the great Lord Reid, as I think one can call him. On page 148 he said: ""How has it come about that the Divisional Court has felt bound to reach such an obviously unjust result?"." Later on at page 151 he said: ""Speaking from a rather long experience of membership of both Houses, I assert with confidence that no Parliament within my recollection would have agreed to make an offence of this kind an absolute offence if the matter had been fully explained"." To adapt those words of Lord Reid to the present case, it seems to me that to convict a defendant of an offence under Clause 13 when he does not know and has no means of knowing that she was a controlled prostitute would be, in the words of Lord Reid, obviously unjust. As to the second quotation, Parliament may have changed since the days of Lord Reid, but I cannot believe that we have deteriorated so far as to make an offence of the kind set out in Clause 13 into an absolute offence without proof of knowledge. The clause is all the more wrong-headed because I cannot see how, as it stands, it would achieve its object. Prostitution is not a crime. I do not see how this clause will serve to protect prostitutes—an important consideration; how it will reduce the demand for prostitution—as is said to be the case; and still less how it will reduce the number of pimps. I confess that when I first saw Clause 13 I was astonished. That was many, many months ago and, for what it may be worth, I expressed that astonishment in a public lecture. I do so again today. I will be happy to see the clause if it is amended as is now proposed, but not otherwise.