Terrorism Act 2006 (Disapplication of Section 25) Order 2009

My Lords, I am grateful to all those who have contributed to the debate. I know that this House appreciates the seriousness of the terrorist threat that we face and the importance of having the right measures in place to counter that threat. That has been reflected in the excellent contributions that have been made. To the noble Baroness, Lady Miller, I say that of course we would like to return to four days. This was mentioned by a couple of other speakers. We all want to get back to that position, but we are still in extremely unusual circumstances. I hope that over time CONTEST 2, which I will come back to, will move us in a direction that will allow us to do that. These are not measures that we use willy-nilly, though: just 11 people have gone over 14 days in the time that this has been in force. We do not just go and use this in a random way; it is tightly controlled and conducted. As I said, I would love to be able to move back via 14 days to four days, but at the moment a return to 14 days is something that the police and the agencies would be very much against, and they advise strongly against it. The noble Baroness touched on the issue that I talked about, the increasingly complex nature of terrorist attacks, and the answer is that they are indeed more complex. Even allowing for our increased expenditure, which has been quite remarkable—from £1 billion to £3.5 billion—they are still highly complex and getting more so all the time. I have to say, too, that they are also getting cuter; they rapidly pick up all the techniques that we use. The moment that any of these techniques are exposed in any way, we find, when we are trying to track these people down and bring them to justice, that they are using their knowledge of those techniques to make it more difficult for us. With regard to the international aspect, the real difficulty is moving through different jurisdictions. We often find, particularly with the way that computer users have been connecting, that they have gone through country after country, and going to those jurisdictions and going through the mechanics of getting hold of information takes a very long time. The noble Baroness raised an issue that I had not raised in my opening speech, for which I am grateful to her: CBRN. That is a real issue. Luckily, I am glad to say, we have not come across a plot that has caused us a real problem, but I am sure, and I have said it a number of times in public, that in those areas it is not a question of if there is an attack of that type but, I am afraid, of when. That is why we put so much effort in CONTEST 2 into countering those. There is a real problem. Think of that incident with the polonium attack—when trying to get into an establishment where something radioactive and unpleasant has been, time is finite, and it adds time to get forensics in there. A couple of speakers raised the issue of moving quickly. We need to move quickly; we are talking about a real danger. These are people who wish to kill hundreds or, if they could, thousands of innocent people. We absolutely cannot take that risk. When we have intelligence of a level that shows us that something is happening, we have to move. It would be much nicer to wait in the old way until there was a body and the chap who had done it had thrown his knife down and run for it. That would be perfect, and we could do it all in 48 hours—it works beautifully. That is why these systems were set up many years ago. However, we are just not in that position now. We know, from some of the plots that we have uncovered and some of the ones that we have managed to disrupt, that they are looking at killing huge numbers of people, and we just cannot take that risk. The noble Baroness mentioned computers and suggested we need more experts. It is not as easy as that. I thank her for raising the 42-days issue; I am scarred by that particular incident and I think I have a Guinness book of records award for the defeat in it. At the time we dealt with that issue, I looked in great detail at the question as to whether we could expand our high-tech unit within the Metropolitan Police Service. But there are narrow choke points and it does not matter whether you have 200 or 2,000 people doing it, because you are tied to working your way through that one thing, and it just does not resolve that bottle-neck. All of those reasons remain and make this necessary. I agree with my noble friend Lord Judd. He is absolutely right—it was touched on by the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Jones—that the fact that we have not had an example for two years, does not mean that it is wrong that we still do this. Indeed, I believe the power is still necessary. Certainly, the police and the agencies absolutely believe that we need this. The JCHR report was mentioned by my noble friend Lord Judd and also by the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Jones, and the noble Lord, Lord Goodhart. As regards the timing, I am not sure how exactly this happened; I do not know how much it is due to the House authorities or to us. It is not very satisfactory. I have not had the chance to go through the JCHR report in detail. One of its points is about better information so Parliament can decide whether to renew the power. That is a good point made by a couple of noble Lords. We already have the important independent oversight of the annual reports of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, on the operation of terrorism legislation. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, is an authoritative and objective voice of scrutiny on all these issues. He recently announced that he will be conducting a review of Operation Pathway arrests in north-west England, which was touched on. As part of this, he will look at circumstances surrounding the detention of the individuals involved; we will be looking very carefully at that report. Due to his impartiality and his unrivalled access to details, it may possibly be the catalyst for looking at further detention issues, including any individuals who are detained beyond the 14-day period. We are considering the impact of the judgment on the question of compatibility with the right to a judicial hearing. But the Government do not accept that there is an automatic read-across to all other proceedings involving the use of closed material. Closed hearings are used very rarely in pre-charge detention extension hearings. They are certainly used less frequently in the later stages of detention beyond the 14 days It raised the very important point of the impact on suspects and communities. During the 42-days debate, a commitment was made to undertake a review of the impact of all counterterrorism legislation. Work on the scope of that review has been ongoing and, while the review will not be specifically about pre-charge detention, it will encompass it. Extensive scoping work means that this assessment has been delayed. A broad research project on the community impact is being progressed and we are committed to deliver this research by November 2009. As regards the presumption of innocence, that is a matter for the Director of Public Prosecutions to consider. In regards to ensuring that court cases are not prejudiced by external factors, such as the media, this already happens in appropriate cases, albeit via the Attorney-General rather than the Crown Prosecution Service. We are addressing these issues. I am sorry I do not have a more comprehensive response, but as was pointed out, I was first aware of this at about 5 pm this evening. The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Jones, raised the issue of how important it is that we reduce pre-charge detention and talked about the flexible threshold test and post-charge questioning. These issues have been looked at in detail. The police and the CPS still do not believe that these actually meet the Bill and I have been through this in some detail. There is a dispute. There are some people who believe it does, but there is quite a large number that does not believe it does. The noble Baroness also pointed out, as did my noble friend Lord Judd, that the fact that this has not been used for two years does not mean that it does not have any value. She is absolutely right on that issue. As regards the Manchester incident, I hope the point that I made—that it is being reviewed by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile—covers it. It was another case where there was intelligence of such a level and nature that, when it was put together, we just could not take the risk. I am absolutely certain of that because I was aware of that intelligence. But, as I say, it is fleeting, and it is not the same as evidence. I cannot say much more about it because there are issues in the case that are still being followed through. As for intercept as evidence—we have had this debate on the Floor of the House before—the Government absolutely support the Chilcot review. The all-party Privy Council group is looking at this and we are moving forward as fast as possible. The nine Chilcot tests are there. I am absolutely certain that this is not a silver bullet and we must make sure that all of the nine tests are actually ticked. We as a Government cannot get ourselves into a position where we could risk what are effectively the crown jewels in our capability. I have already mentioned these people’s acuteness and the speed with which they pick up any of our techniques when we expose them. If we gave those away, there would be a real danger and risk to our people. We have to be certain. That is why the nine tests that Chilcot laid down are absolutely right and we are working through all of them. If we cannot be absolutely sure that we are not putting these things at risk, we should not do it. We will have to see where that stands; we have not got to that point yet. The noble Baroness mentioned that we need to get terrorists behind bars. I would say that we have put almost 200 behind bars over the past five or six years; so we are achieving that. People quote instances of what other countries do about intercept, but those countries are very different and comparisons are sometimes worse than useless. Comparing what the FBI might do with a phone tap does not relate to what the West Country can do with the internet and things like that. It is a completely different world. On control orders, we looked specifically at a group of nine such cases. There was not a single case in which intercept as evidence would have made a difference. I think that we need to be extremely wary there. I was surprised that the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Jones, mentioned a lack of knowledge of the threat. CONTEST 2 is one of the things that I have been very proud of. It explains the threat in great detail. It gives a history of the threat and talks through it. I have no doubt whatever, having been around the world, that it is the world’s best counterterrorism strategy at the moment. It does explain it. Does that mean that we need to have a debate on it? I have no difficulty about a debate in the future. I cannot promise a debate on counterterrorism, because it depends on parliamentary business, but I would love to have one. I am very proud of what we have achieved over the past two years in counterterrorism—in our Prevent strategy, in countering extremism, in stopping radicalisation. We have probably the most comprehensive strategy in the world. We cannot protect and arrest our way out of this problem, but as the strategy starts to bite and work, I hope that we will become safer, and then we can get rid of these requirements to hold people before charge for this length of time. Similarly, what we have done in Protect and by holding the ring is crucial. We have done a lot to protect crowded places and transport and all of these things. As for the Pursue part of our strategy—that is, catching these people and arresting them—this 28-day provision is still a crucial part of it. That is why I believe that we need to keep it. I hope that I have answered most of the questions raised. I know that there are differing views on the issue. I am reassured by the knowledge that the aim of all noble Lords is to keep this great nation of ours safe. We might have different perceptions of how to do that but I am absolutely convinced that we are doing the right thing. In the final analysis, we as a Government are responsible for the lives of our people. They have the right to life. Crucially, sometimes we do things that are not the things that we would like or love to do, because there is still a very great threat to this nation. I do not want to keep on about that because one the great joys of the British people is that they get on with life—they live it, have fun, work and travel. I want them to do that because otherwise we will be doing the terrorists’ work for them. CONTEST 2 will start to achieve that, and this is a small but none the less very important fragment of that. I invite the House to approve the order.