Policing and Crime Bill

I shall speak also to Amendment 6. I have already declared an interest as president of the Association of Police Authorities. I declare an interest also as chair of the Security Industry Authority. These two amendments take different approaches but deal with the same concern, which is to ensure that the national influence in appointing the most senior police officers does not outweigh the local interest. Much of the strength and credibility of British policing lies in getting this delicate balance right. If we get it wrong, the consequences will be serious. First, I apologise to the Committee, because both amendments have slight errors in the form in which they appear on the Marshalled List. For clarity, I will explain what is meant when I reach the relevant sections. My first amendment takes the simplest approach. It is intended to remove the whole clause, apart from subsection (2), which relates to delegated functions and the role of HMIC. I accept that HMIC should no longer have delegated functions to carry out the Secretary of State’s role in approving senior appointments, given its new and more independent role as set out in the Green Paper. However, the amendment as shown in the Marshalled List suggests that subsections (3) and (4) should also remain. This is an error, for which I apologise. If the main part of this clause is removed, these subsections must go, too. This is covered in Amendment 11, which should really be debated alongside Amendment 5A. When we come to debate Amendment 11, I shall seek to withdraw it. The amendment would result in the senior appointments panel remaining a non-statutory body. I listened carefully to the Minister at Second Reading, and I support his desire to make the senior appointments panel more independent and more proactive, but I am afraid that I do not see why it needs to be a statutory body to operate in this way. This will merely inject unwelcome additional bureaucracy into the appointments process and hand greater powers to the Home Secretary of the day, and to his or her officials, to direct this body in favour of national requirements to the detriment of local interests and requirements. It might be worth reiterating that the local police authority has the power to appoint chief officers, not the Home Secretary, whose role is to approve appointments made by police authorities. My noble friend therefore has yet to convince me that a statutory body is necessary for the Home Secretary to carry out this role of approval effectively or for police authorities to take heed of advice on the wider national strategic requirements. As noble Lords will notice, I am taking a twin-track approach here, so I argue that a statutory body is not necessary. If we accept that it is desirable, I am concerned about the precise nature of some of the proposals that are set out in Clause 2, so my second amendment deals with that situation. Again, before explaining exactly what my concerns are, I must apologise to the Committee for an error in the amendment on the Marshalled List. Proposed new subsection (18) should refer to subsections (12) and (13)—that is, to the respective functions of the Secretary of State and police authorities to approve and make senior appointments. Broadly speaking, my Amendment 6 is designed to introduce precisely the more independent and proactive approach to which my noble friend has alluded, without the centralised approach that risks upsetting the national/local balance. The amendment makes it clear that the make-up of the panel needs to be balanced so that the Home Secretary’s appointees cannot outnumber the appointees nominated by police authorities and chief officers. It would also enable the panel to elect its own chair, rather than leaving this appointment to the Home Secretary. It would provide independence to the panel to determine its own arrangements for conducting its business, rather than those arrangements being set out by the Home Secretary. Perhaps most importantly, my amendment is more explicit about what the functions of the panel should be. Specifically, it includes the ability to give general advice not just to the Home Secretary but to police authorities. If the Home Secretary needs advice on approving chief officer appointments, it is only sensible that that advice should also be given to the bodies that make the appointments. The functions also include the critical duty of developing a more consistent and robust system for setting out the criteria for prioritising vacancies and considering candidates for them. This problem has long existed and has never been satisfactorily resolved. It always means that some authorities must wait much longer than others before it is their turn to interview available candidates. It also means that, for those who come later in the queue, the pool of available candidates tends to be smaller. In the past, this has been dealt with by a process of negotiation reaching eventual consensus. That has not been without problems, however, and a new and more proactive panel should be required to see whether there are ways of improving the system. Finally, the amendment would give the panel the flexibility to carry out any other functions that may be necessary to fulfil its main duties. This would replace an order-making power for the Secretary of State to confer additional functions. All these proposed provisions in Amendment 6 are based on practical experience of the workings of this body. If the body is to be made statutory, it should be made statutory to improve its workings and to make it a more effective body for all the parties concerned—the Secretary of State, the police authorities and senior police officers. In moving this amendment, I hope that my noble friend will agree that the amendment would genuinely provide for an independent and proactive panel that is properly balanced between the tripartite policing partners and national and local requirements. I beg to move.