Marine and Coastal Access Bill [HL]

My Lords, I support the noble Lord, Lord Goodlad, the chairman of the Constitution Committee, of which I am a member, in his thanks to the Government for agreeing that there should be a right of appeal. That has been the consistent line of the Constitution Committee throughout, and it is of the utmost importance that a right of appeal is seen to be transparent. Having gone that far, I fear that I cannot agree with the noble Lord on this amendment. The procedures described in the clause state that, as in most planning considerations, a person is appointed to hear evidence. That is the basis on which the bulk of planning decisions are taken. Having heard admissible evidence, the planning inspector, in due course, makes recommendations to the Secretary of State for his determination. It is the Secretary of State’s decision, and his alone. He is accountable, in general, to Parliament. In particular instances, a rare procedure of having a parliamentary debate on the matter can be invoked. I got into a great deal of hot water as a planning Minister for six years in Wales, when I determined, as regards the future of industrial development in Ebbw Vale, following the closure of the steelworks, that I had to overturn the recommendation of the planning inspector, who wanted to fill in various parts of the area with the odd bit of industrial development. I took the holistic view that the only way to give hope to that community was to ensure that particular land was designated on a sufficient scale to provide the basis for attracting industry, and that you would not achieve that in the same way if you were merely in-filling pockets. In those circumstances, the decision of the Secretary of State would be limited, if this amendment were to be accepted, because he, ""must comply with the recommendation of the appointed person unless, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, there are exceptional circumstances"." What on earth are "exceptional circumstances" in this context? If the amendment were to be passed and if exceptional circumstances can be defined, the decision would be taken away from the Secretary of State and his power would be extremely limited. First, this is not workable, and, secondly, it abdicates the responsibility of the Secretary of State, because such matters should be for his determination, and his alone.