Equality Bill

I would certainly agree that the Labour party had a very good record on equality up to the 1997 general election. Indeed, I think that it was the hon. Member for Buckingham (John Bercow), who has contributed enormously well to the debate on a number of occasions, who pointed out that it was a social democratic approach—I would say that it is also liberal. It is no surprise, therefore, that Roy Jenkins was so heavily involved in the Labour party in the moves to provide equality in certain areas at a time when it was less popular to do so and less acceptable than it is now. The Government will get this Bill through—I hope that they do—and it is hardly being opposed in this House. That is a sign that the Government are pushing against an extremely open door in a way that the Labour party could not when it introduced earlier legislative proposals to provide for equality. The Government are implementing, quite rightly, their manifesto commitment to abolish unjustified discrimination wherever it exists. My regret is that that was a 1997 election manifesto commitment. Over the 12 years for which I have been a Member of this House, I have questioned why it has taken so long for the Government and the House to do some of the things that could have been done many years previously. My party's record is pretty good. We opposed section 28 when it was introduced, for example, and pressed for an early end to discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation. We first tabled amendments to the criminal law in 1998 to bring in laws on sexual offences that treated people equally, regardless of sexual orientation. That legislation was enacted in 2003. The Government were forced by European judgments to bring in equality on the ground of sexual orientation in the armed forces, but they should have done so before. We also urged them to introduce civil partnerships legislation, which they have now done, and supported them to the hilt when they introduced the controversial—for some—regulations on the provision of goods and services without discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation. On age discrimination, I remember urging my colleagues through the Lobby to vote on an amendment to the Employment Relations Bill in the late 1990s, to end age discrimination in employment. We have also argued that that could and should have been brought in as part of the Equality Act 2006. Nevertheless, we are where we are now, and I welcome the fact that the Government are introducing these provisions. I want to discuss three topics: the balance to be struck between free speech and harassment; the exemptions on discrimination, particularly on the grounds of religion and sexual orientation, where another tension obviously exists; and the proposed public sector duty, every aspect of which is to include a duty to promote equal opportunities in respect of religion. I ought to declare a couple of interests. I am a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which has performed significant scrutiny of previous equality legislation and proposes to do much more on this Bill. We have already had a very useful and mutually beneficial meeting with officials from the equalities team. I also hold honorary positions with the British Humanist Association, the Liberal Democrat lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender campaign, and the National Secular Society. Before I start on my three topics, I want to point out that inequality is a vital issue in this country. It is terrible that the gap between the rich and the poor has got wider. The rich, even in this recession, are far richer than they were 12 years ago, and, even before the recession, the poor were relatively poorer than they were before. Radical action is needed, and my hon. Friend the Member for Hornsey and Wood Green (Lynne Featherstone) has already said that she does not think that the provisions in the Bill represent that radical action. It is policies that will bring about the end of inequality, including policies on taxation. I am still astounded about what has happened on tax policy over the last three Parliaments. The fair taxes have not been increased, but the regressive ones have. For the Conservative party to say that it wants to do something about the inequality in wealth between the rich and the poor while its flagship policy is to cut the tax payable by the richest estates in the country is simply astonishing. The hon. Member for Shipley (Philip Davies) intervened on the hon. Member for Kingswood (Roger Berry) to make a point about political correctness, and I should like to say to him that the Campaign Against Political Correctness might be against the Bill, but political correctness can work both ways. If it is politically correct to say that it is not acceptable—I mean socially acceptable; I am not arguing about criminality here—to call people "cripples" or "spastics", then I support political correctness. If supporting political correctness means that it becomes unacceptable—even in private, where it would not be against the law—to call people "sooty" or "Paki", then I support political correctness. The hon. Gentleman needs to define what he means by political correctness. If he defines it very narrowly, I might agree with him, but it is not enough just to talk about it as the tabloids do. My first topic is the balance between free speech and laws that protect people. What kind of protection are we talking about in anti-harassment provisions? We are talking about the freedom from being offended, or worse. I certainly accept that this is not just about being offended. This can occur in public, in employment and in the provision of goods and services, including a special case involving public services and the delivery of public functions. In public, the Government have rightly accepted that there is a difference between homophobic or religious hatred and, for example, racial hatred, because the offence involved is very narrow. They have recognised that free speech can be impeded. I am sure that I would not agree with most of that speech, but I recognise that some religious organisations, for example, need to be able to explain their views on sexual orientation or the religious beliefs of others. Similarly, I have argued for amendment of section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986, which criminalises the use of insult as being likely to cause distress, goes too far and could lead to bizarre prosecutions or investigations by the police. I hope the Government will recognise the point. They have made an exception in cases of religion and homophobia, and they are right to do so. In employment, there is protection against harassment, and employment probably provides the strongest case for it because one has to be secure at work, but our harassment provisions are pretty wide. Indeed, the human rights memorandum on the Joint Committee on Human Rights website, probably also to be found on the Government Equalities Office website, accepts the point, stating that harassment laws""have been controversial in respect of certain protected characteristics (namely, religion or belief, sexual orientation and gender reassignment) and opponents have been concerned that applying the broader domestic definition of harassment to these characteristics could infringe Article 9 and Article 10 Convention rights."" I hope that question will be dealt with in Committee. It is not simply a matter of defining harassment as engaging in""unwanted conduct related to a relevant protected characteristic which has the purpose or effect of… creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment"," because also relevant is""the purpose or effect of violating a person's dignity"." Because it is non-intentional and because the views of the victim are important, this can be cast very widely. I worry when I hear about cases such as the Christian night-shift worker who was having a conversation with a fellow worker about his views on homosexuality; apparently, although we only have his side of the story, he said in moderate terms that he thought it was wrong. Even if there were no prosecution under harassment law, as it were, I think it would be wrong if employers decided to take a strong view simply because someone felt that their dignity was violated because they were gay or knew someone who was gay and could not accept anyone sincerely disagreeing with them and using non-abusive language. I believe that that is going too far; we should not have to read that sort of press story or hear about that sort of activity. Here, I stand four-square with religious people who feel that they are not allowed to say those sorts of things. I do not recommend it, of course, but if they avoid abusive language, that is acceptable. With goods and services, the Government are right not to include harassment provisions relating to sexual orientation or religion. It was right that the Northern Ireland provisions were essentially struck down and have not been reintroduced in the Bill. It is impossible to restrict people's ability to explain their point of view when not providing goods and services. When it comes to the provision of public services and public functions, the question remains whether there might be scope for introducing some protection from harassment; gross harassment, of course, is discrimination. I was pleased to support the Equality Act 2006, which finally and rightly protected religious people—people with religion or belief—from discrimination. Indeed, as hon. Members may know, my private Member's Bill goes further to protect Catholics, in particular, from unjustified discrimination in our constitution. My Bill received support from all political parties, but it was talked out by the Lord Chancellor, no less, on Second Reading. I think that religious organisations, however, show too great a willingness to want to discriminate against other people. They accept the protections that they have been given, but want the scope to discriminate against other people—for example, on grounds of sexual orientation or religion. Schedule 9 deals with exemptions for religions in respect of employment. I recognise that the drafting here is better than it was in the Employment Equality (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 2003. The import of the Amicus case has been included, where the provision states that a post with a sexual orientation test has to be one clearly involved in proselytising and not another. The subsequent provisions on page 182 of the Bill are, sadly, weaker, allowing organisations with a religious ethos not to have to justify the discrimination that they may wish to indulge in on grounds of religion, for example. Nevertheless, even that is better than the coach and horses run through the spirit of the Bill by the Schools Standards and Frameworks Act 1998, particularly sections 68, 69 and 70. As I was told by a maths teacher working in a state school funded 100 per cent. by the taxpayer, those provisions allow schools to tell teachers—regardless of whether they are teaching religious education—that they must have "Jesus in your heart". Is that really necessary for someone teaching maths in a primary school? What is going on? I find it regrettable that the Government have not taken the opportunity to recognise that organisations with a certain ethos can, if necessary, be governed by provisions that already operate in relation to a religious test, as opposed to a broad exception involving many other posts. As for the provision of goods and services, the problem still exists that schools are allowed to discriminate and segregate on the basis of religion. In an area containing, say, four schools, where one has a religious intake and can segregate and discriminate, children or families adhering to the religion concerned can choose any of those four schools, while everyone else has a choice of only three. If that is coupled with the public duty to provide equality of opportunity, a huge amount of pressure will be exerted for everyone to have their own school that discriminates, and I do not think that that is a good idea. The provision of public services involves a key question. Should there be a right to discriminate on grounds of religion, or indeed sexual orientation? I hope that, in Committee, the Government will recognise that the Employment Appeal Tribunal was correct in saying, in the case of the Islington registrar Lillian Ladele, that it was wrong for someone providing a public service to be allowed to discriminate, and that the council was right to say that everyone doing that job must not treat people differently according to their sexual orientation. We have read of a dentist who wants to require his women patients to wear a hijab before being able to access health care either on the NHS or privately. That cannot be right. Reasonable adjustment may be possible. For example, a cook may not want to cook pork. That does not involve discriminating against human beings, at least in respect of what they are doing, and it does not necessarily involve a public function. Finally, let me say something about the positive duty in regard to religion. Religion is different from the other strands. For example, it is not essential or immutable in the same way as race or gender. Religious beliefs give rise to policies and practices that are highly contested, unlike the other strands. Representatives of religions —rightly, in many cases—feel the need to proselytise in order to secure new followers, unlike representatives of other strands. Some religions campaign actively against equal treatment in relation to other strands, as they have a right to do. They are unique in that respect. For that reason, I think that, while we should ensure that there is a public duty to end discrimination on religious grounds and promote social cohesion, tackling inequality relating to religion may actually increase religious sensitivities. People may feel that they are not being given what someone else is being given because of historic service provision in that area, and may want the same for themselves. An example is the demand for it to be considered that sharia law might be given more status in relation to other religious laws. Those are the issues that I hope to raise in Committee.