Equality Bill

Not in detail, but I think we got to the right outcome in the end. I felt that there was a certain naiveté on the part of the right hon. and learned Lady in assuming that legislation could somehow automatically eliminate any difficulties. At one point I was moved to intervene on her—I aborted the attempt—to ask whether the absence of a public sector duty was somehow directly responsible for the fact that inequalities in this country had increased over the past 10 years. We should be looking for agreement where we can find it, however, and I certainly broadly welcome the concept of the Bill, and many of its provisions. We are not going to get into the business of abolishing inequalities overnight, but almost everyone in the Chamber would accept the principles of equality under the law and of equality of opportunity as being important for a healthy society. I am happy to say that I believe there is a moral case for greater equality, because we all deserve decent treatment. There is also a social case, because a society that is not frustrated by inequalities is more likely to be a happy and cohesive one. There is also an economic case, although the evidence for that is not conclusive, because gross income inequalities are likely to depress national output and competitiveness. I go on from that to support the broad approach to the single Bill and the body of law that bridges the various strands of discrimination. I admire the work led by Trevor Phillips in his equalities review, not least because it brought the question of outcomes—to which I have already referred in relation to the Gypsy and Traveller population—to the fore, and the careful, painstaking, parallel review of equality law that took place. Both reviews have informed this legislation. It is surely sensible to unite concepts and process in a piece of overarching legislation. I would add for consideration, possibly in Committee, that we need to give some attention to equality of access, and I can mention two areas in which there have been difficulties historically. The first is educational discrimination in relation to special educational needs. When there is a special educational needs and disability—SEND—tribunal in the compulsory years, access is much more likely to take place than it is in further or higher education, where there might have to be recourse to the county court. Secondly, disability discrimination duties are expressed in part II of the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 in relation to employment and, in part III, in relation to goods and services. I am not saying that a tribunal is always the right approach, but the fact is that more people use them than go to the courts. All these points should be subject to detailed scrutiny in Committee, and I am particularly anxious that there should be no perceived dilution of the Bill's coverage of disability, which is a more complex case. Having said that, I am happy to have a single codification of the law, and I do not rule that out as an important factor in driving social progress. It is, to some extent, a lever of desirable change. However, given the experience with equal pay—the relevant legislation is now more than 30 years old—very few people would argue that the law itself will achieve an immediate or conclusive result. I hope that we will have a common aim of equality and that we will use the law appropriately, and not unduly puff its ability to deliver. At the same time, for moral reasons, neither direct nor indirect discrimination should be acceptable. I shall move on from the body of law—important though that is—to examine some wider and more positive concepts, some vision matters and some matters of culture, where things can be a little more difficult to deliver. My unease—such as it is—about the detailed provisions of the Bill echoes some of the concerns set out by my right hon. Friend the Member for Maidenhead (Mrs. May) in her speech and in the reasoned amendment. The Bill is sometimes waffly and unspecific on public duties, which are not yet adequately defined or costed in regard to compliance. At the same time, however, it is unduly intrusive on the private sector. This is not a good time to introduce further costs, not least those involved in familiarising industry with the legislation. There are likely to be substantial one-off costs and continuing compliance costs, at a time when industry already has considerable burdens of its own.