Political Parties and Elections Bill

The noble Lord, Lord Bates, in moving these important amendments, has rightly elided the amendments in this group and others in the next group, and the noble Lord, Lord Rennard, made the same point. The amendments were originally in the same group but were divided up. I hope that the noble Lord will forgive me if I deal with both these issues in what I say now, which may shorten the debate on the next group. This is an important and large group of amendments, which all seek the same drafting change through the different parts of new Schedule 19C to the 2000 Act, as inserted by Schedule 2 to the Bill. I shall speak on them all together, if I may. For each of the different available sanctions, the various amendments seek to add the additional phrase "in any case" to the relevant provisions that allow the commission to impose the sanction. I am grateful for the support shown for the increased flexibility that the Bill proposes and for the civil sanctions regime that will become law if the Bill passes. They will no doubt become widely used for breaches in this area. By way of example, Amendment 28 amends the provision for imposing a fixed monetary penalty on a person. New Schedule 19C, paragraph 1(1), states that: ""The Commission may by notice impose a fixed monetary penalty on a person"." Under this amendment, the phrase would change to: ""The Commission may in any case by notice impose a fixed monetary penalty on a person"." We do not believe that the amendment is necessary, although I take the point that it is a probing amendment. The fact that the commission may impose a sanction "in any case" in which the sanction powers are available to it is implicit in the wording of the schedule For example, paragraph 1(1) states that: ""The Commission may by notice impose a fixed monetary penalty on a person"." The fact that the commission "may" impose the sanction also means that it may do so in any case. If this was not the intention, the Bill would have needed to set out the cases in which sanctions could not be imposed. The only significant limitation on imposing a sanction that we apply to the commission is that it must satisfy the relevant evidential proof which, in the instance of fixed monetary penalties and discretionary requirements, is set at the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt. There are also important limitations that ensure that the amount of fixed monetary penalties for summary offences or offences that are triable either way may not exceed an amount that could be imposed in criminal proceedings. The effect of these amendments, if carried, might be to provide that civil sanctions are available for all breaches of the 2000 Act rather than for those breaches prescribed in secondary legislation. The noble Lord, Lord Rennard, suggested that it should be for Parliament to decide the status of each of these offences. That is what we intend to do in due course through secondary legislation. That would be consistent with the intention underlying related amendments dealing with the word "prescribed", which I will come to in a moment. If that is the intention of these amendments, we would resist them because we agree with the noble Lord, Lord Rennard, that it would pre-empt Parliament considering the appropriate breaches that should attract civil sanctions. We should not at this point limit the flexibility to determine which offences should be subject to the new civil sanctions. It is worth noting that the recommendation of the Committee on Standards in Public Life’s review of the Electoral Commission, published in January 2007, which was quoted by the noble Lord, Lord Bates, when he moved his amendment, was that the most serious breaches of the law should remain in the criminal sphere. Accepting these amendments would prevent us from a proper debate on the merits of this and other proposals as it would automatically ensure that all offences under the 2000 Act would be subject to civil sanctions. We believe that secondary legislation is more appropriate. It is our intention that the order prescribing the offences will contain other important procedural matters and will, in its entirety, be subject to the approval of this House and another place. The noble Lord referred to the use of the word "prescribed". We believe that by removing the word "prescribed" from new Schedule 19C, we would be ensuring that the Electoral Commission would be able to apply a civil sanction to any of the offences or contraventions of restrictions or requirements in PPERA. This is because the offences would be punishable by a civil sanction and would not need to be prescribed in secondary legislation. The amendments that the noble Lord may move in due course may seek the same end as the group that we are discussing now; namely, the removal of the need for a statutory instrument to prescribe the offences for breaches of which civil sanctions will be applicable. As I said, it is our intention to set out in a statutory instrument, subject to affirmative resolution by both Houses of Parliament, which offences will be punishable by the new civil sanctions. We think that that is the proper means of achieving our objective. Indeed, in its latest briefing on the Bill, the commission notes that it expects that Parliament, ""would prefer to retain the ability to scrutinise the offences and contraventions in respect of which the Commission is to be able to impose the new sanctions"." We believe that it may be useful to retain the option to reserve some of the most severe offences purely in the criminal sphere; that is, not by civil sanctions but by criminal law, as recommended by the Committee on Standards in Public Life. We certainly believe that the majority of offences or requirements should be subject to civil sanctions, and also that we should retain the option to reserve the most serious breaches for the criminal sphere only. If the amendments were to be carried, they would prevent us doing that. My noble friend Lord Campbell-Savours asked a very pertinent question about an impoverished offender, if I may use that phrase.