UK Parliament / Open data

Political Parties and Elections Bill

I thank noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. I apologise that the important government amendments on the identify issue have not been introduced until very recently, but it is not as though the official Opposition did not know that there were going to be considerable delays in getting the amendments before noble Lords. This was a policy announcement made on Report in another place on 2 March. It was made absolutely clear that the draftsmen, along with the officials from the department, would have to spend a lot of time making sure that the amendments for this important policy change—one that the noble Lord’s party supports in principle—should be accurate and well done. I said at the open meeting last week, at Second Reading and in private discussions in general—and the noble Lord was kind enough to be gracious about that—that this would take some time. We have put them down so they are in time for next week. I appreciate that they are complicated and that this is an important matter. What I would say to the noble Lord and to all noble Lords present, on the Front Benches particularly, is that I called an open meeting today, although it was at an inconvenient time and I understand why. However, my officials are available to discuss the Government’s amendments with them and with other noble Lords during the course of the next few days and will be happy to do so given the circumstances of this matter. These are very complex provisions and represent a significant addition to the Bill, so they needed very careful drafting. The noble Lord, Lord Tyler, talked about us all being self-confessed experts. I found that a rather worrying phrase, particularly bearing in mind that the Committee stage has to end some time during this calendar year—and a little bit previous to that, I hope, in any event. However, I do not dispute what he said about us all thinking we are experts. I should also declare, as I forgot to do, that I am chairman of a constituency Labour Party. This amendment would alter Clause 1, which sets out the commission’s role in securing compliance with the controls imposed by the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000. I hope that we will find a shorthand way in which to refer to that Act. The clause emphasises that the commission has a role in monitoring compliance with these controls, but also goes further, and clearly emphasises the commission’s role in securing compliance with the controls. In doing so, it makes clear that part of the role is the consideration of what steps, if any, need to be taken in order to secure compliance. The clause is intended, in response to recommendations to this effect from the Committee on Standards in Public Life, to clarify the commission's role as a proactive regulator. Regulators do not just monitor but have a duty to secure compliance, too. It does so by making it clear that a key feature of the commission’s role is to actively encourage and work to deliver compliance with the requirements and restrictions of the Act. This includes use of the commission’s investigatory and civil sanctioning powers, as provided by this Bill, and which we will come to in due course. Clause 1 is intended to address the recommendations of the Committee on Standards in Public Life that PPERA should be amended—and it does need amendment, if you look at Section 145—to make it clear that the commission has a duty to investigate proactively allegations or suspicions of failures to comply with the regulatory framework. Evidence received by the committee suggested that the commission’s interpretation of its regulatory mandate in PPERA has led it to taking a passive approach, which had in turn made it a less effective regulator. We do not think that imposing a formal duty to investigate is quite the right approach. In relation to the commission generally, PPERA is drafted in terms of its functions and that is also the approach that we have adopted. We concluded that it might be counter productive to impose a strict legal duty on the commission to investigate every allegation it receives, regardless of merit. That could have raised questions about what was needed to discharge the duty in each case and might have exposed the commission to the risk of unwarranted legal challenges on the point, which might have diverted its resources in a way that would have been frankly unhelpful. At basic level, we agreed with the thrust of the CSPL recommendation, and that is the reason for the changes that occur in Clause 1(2). The reference to taking steps to secure compliance implicitly refers to the possibility of the commission using the investigatory powers and civil sanctions provided for by the Bill. Various noble Lords are concerned about when this compliance will be needed. It will be an integral part of the commission's approach as a modern regulator. As I said, it has been criticised in the past for being a little passive in its regulation role, receiving information by the bucketful rather than taking proactive steps to encourage compliance. It is fair to say that the commission has taken some steps recently to take a more active role, but this clarification and the sanctions and powers in the Bill will enable it to do more, such as issue disclosure notices to seek information if a breach is suspected. What steps will the commission focus on? The reasoning behind the wording is to focus the commission's mind on the steps available, such as using supervisory powers where there are concerns over the adequacy of record keeping by a certain body, for example, or, in more serious cases, concerns about a suspected breach of the 2000 Act and consideration of the use of civil sanctions. The noble Lord, Lord Tyler, described our attitude in the Bill as wishy-washy. I dispute that. The wording in the Bill is "taking steps", which is not at all wishy-washy. It implies action and that is intended to be the commission's role. In short, it will regulate rather than just purely monitor. How will the powers be used? Each power in the Bill has appropriate safeguards, including appeals against the imposition of civil sanctions. The commission has already published a draft enforcement policy focusing on a new risk-based approach and setting out how it intends to use the new powers. The guidance is subject to consultation and the commission, I am told, welcomes views on it. The commission knows and is clear—as is the Bill—that powers must be used proportionately and reasonably. I am not certain whether the amendment is a real probing amendment or whether there is more behind it. It appears to seek to limit the commission's role to monitoring compliance with the controls imposed by the Act. As my noble friend Lord Borrie said, the effect of the amendment would be to remove the clarity intended by Clause 1 and would maintain the status quo, which the CSPL has rightly said is unhelpful. For that reason, we resist the amendment. I have explained the reasons behind the drafting of the Bill, which we believe is appropriate. To sum up, for the commission to be taken seriously as an effective regulator, it must be clear to it and to those it regulates that taking steps to secure compliance and implicitly to deter behaviour is an intrinsic part of its regulatory role. Identification of a suspected breach or contravention of the Act cannot be the end of the matter as far as the commission is concerned. The commission cannot tick the box saying that we have monitored this but we are not doing anything about it. It must have the power to do something about it, too. What deterrent would there be to persistent and wilful breaches of the law if there were no consequences? I hope that the Committee will agree that a regulator that can only monitor compliance with controls within its competence, but not take steps to secure compliance, will be restricted as a regulator. To remove the reference to taking steps to secure compliance would send the wrong message and risk cementing certain perceptions of the commission as not being sufficiently robust. That would do nothing to build public trust and confidence, which all parties clearly think that we need in our political and democratic system. I hope that, on the basis of what has been said, the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
Type
Proceeding contribution
Reference
710 c55-8GC 
Session
2008-09
Chamber / Committee
House of Lords Grand Committee
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