Marine and Coastal Access Bill [HL]

Clause 286 places a duty on the Secretary of State and Natural England to secure two objectives. The first objective is that there is a long-distance route or routes for the whole of the English coast; the second is that there is associated with the route or routes a wider margin of recreational land available to the public on foot for employment in conjunction with that route. The amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, seek to remove the wording from subsections (8)(a)(ii) and (8)(b)(ii). This would mean that the only functions Natural England and the Secretary of State could exercise in relation to the coastal access duty would be those set out in Part 8 of the Bill, Part IV of the 1949 Act and Part 1 of the CROW Act. We wish to have paragraphs (a)(ii) and (b)(ii) of that subsection in place because we think it is sensible for Natural England and the Secretary of State to be able to exercise any of their other functions that they consider relevant for the purpose of considering the coastal access duty. The noble Lord, Lord Greaves, invited me to give an example. In some situations they might wish to make agreements with landowners that will improve the public’s experience of the coastal margin through sympathetic management measures, and that relates to Natural England’s functions in other legislation. I can give an example of where the Secretary of State might wish to exercise functions: under Section 193 of the Law of Property Act 1925, to impose limitations on access to urban and metropolitan commons for reasons listed in that section. I hope that the noble Lord will understand that this is not an attempt to give either Natural England or the Secretary of State draconian powers to intervene in this area; it just makes it clear that where either the Secretary of State or Natural England have statutory functions and where it might help the coastal access duty, they can use them as well as the powers they are given in the legislation we are debating.