Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism

My right hon. and learned Friend naturally anticipates the point that I am about to make. However, let me return briefly to Lord Carlile, because for some reason he did not return to the issue in his fourth report. Perhaps he got fed up with repeating himself and with the Government's not paying any attention. I have established by parliamentary question, answered on 12 February, that two controlees have now been under orders for more than three years and three for between two and three years. That figure could have been as high as nine had six of those subject to orders between April 2006 and February 2007 not absconded. The conclusion is that the Government have not bothered satisfactorily to remedy the situation, despite requests from us and the independent reviewer to do so. When I was appointed to this post just over a month ago, I was conscious that, unusually, this was not about the Opposition making a statement but was likely to be a decision about the conduct of Government policy. If the Conservative party opposes these orders, the Government, with their majority, will probably carry the day in this place. However, that will probably not be the case in the other place, which will address the issue of renewal on Thursday. As the Government have to convince both Houses and as these powers expire on 11 March, they would have to have an alternative monitoring scheme in place for the 15 individuals within 40 days. Is an operational plan in place if Parliament declines the Government's request for renewal? Any alternative plan would presumably involve appropriate levels of surveillance, helped by the fact that much of it will not have to be covert as the target will anticipate that his activities will be monitored. Can we assume that not all the measures have to be new? Presumably there is already additional surveillance of the individuals in addition to the control order measures, not least because of the high proportion of absconders. We know that comprehensive surveillance is expensive and human resource intensive, and that it will require an appropriate plan for each individual. To achieve equivalence with a control order regime, however, foolproof surveillance is not the standard as a fifth of those subject to control orders have absconded. The control order regime is also expensive. We have some idea of the cost from the answer given to my question yesterday. The cost of elements of the control order regime that I identified was more than £3 million without the cost of the supervision arrangements or the costs of the control order review group. The current arrangement is costing well over £200,000 a year per controlee. Control orders should be assessed in the context of the whole counter-terrorism strategy, as well as in the context of the financial cost. I believe that they do damage to the "prevent" element of the strategy because of the message of oppression that they impart to those vulnerable to being suborned into violence against our state, its institutions and people. Have the Government conducted an impact assessment of the control order regime on vulnerable communities? The Minister's answer to the hon. Member for Islington, North (Jeremy Corbyn) suggested that their assessment is based more on talks with the communities, but I think that something rather more rigorous is required. Control orders also damage our wider sense of security because of the exceptional measures that are viewed by the Government as necessary. They do damage to the basic notion of British liberty and the values we seek to defend. As for the benefits, they are a temporary patch on a hole in our defences that has been created because we have not yet had the wit to find a way to convict or deport people we believe to be associated with terrorism. If we were not so close to a general election, I would not hesitate to recommend to my right hon. and hon. Friends that we vote against these measures and rip this patch off because, in isolation, the system of control orders is defective. Such a recommendation would come in spite of the natural wish of a patriotic party in opposition to give the Government the benefit of the doubt when they claim that national security at stake. The difficulty that we face is that, in one disreputable episode after another, the Government have forfeited any benefit of the doubt on their most sacred responsibility, which is to keep the nation safe. They do not need to take that from me, as the hon. Member for Thurrock (Andrew Mackinlay) expressed the sentiment eloquently last week, following the statement on the non-release of Cabinet minutes relating to the decision on the Iraq war. I have to say that I share the hon. Gentleman's sentiments. Coming to the view that we should not obstruct the renewal of the measures today is not about giving this exhausted and discredited Administration the benefit of the doubt, but about finding the most appropriate way to prepare for the likely exercise of these responsibilities by June next year. I do not know the result of the next election. It would be both impertinent and unwise to presume on the electorate, but I think they would expect an aspirant Administration preparing to take on responsibility for counter-terrorism and security policies to treat the prospect with the utmost seriousness. Therefore, my analysis is based on the assumption that we will be faced with those responsibilities by June next year. Our counter-terrorism legislation is at best a bureaucratic mess, and at worst has powers that make the situation worse. Let us consider just how we have arrived at this point: the Terrorism Act 2000 was followed by the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, which was implemented in a hurry after 9/11. Further legislation in 2003 made amendments to the 2000 Act, while the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 was required after the 2001 Act was found to be inconsistent with the Human Rights Act 1998. Then the Terrorism Act 2006 was implemented in the post-7/7 environment, and after that came the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008. Throw in two Northern Ireland Acts for good measure and we have as confusing a pot pourri as any lawyer could desire. It has presented us with the ridiculous juxtaposition of Abu Qatada receiving a deportation order one day, and compensation the next. The warning about the opportunity being created issued by my hon. and learned Friend the shadow Justice Secretary has been fully justified. The case for consolidation is overwhelming, and it was made by a Labour Home Secretary more than three years ago. On 2 February 2006, the right hon. Member for Norwich, South (Mr. Clarke) said that he intended to""plan for the development of a draft Bill that takes into account all the work that I have laid out to be published in the first half of 2007 for pre-legislative scrutiny."—[Official Report, 2 February 2006; Vol. 442, c. 479.]" The 2008 Act dealt with little of the work that he referred to. No progress was made on intercept as evidence, and no change arose from the review of the operation of control order. Therefore, the overwhelming case is not for consolidation only but also for a full review of the powers that the state has taken. The review and consolidation should be comprehensive and not piecemeal. The fact that we are probably within touching distance of being able to complete the review with the benefit of the advice available to a Government has decided me in favour of not removing the patch on the hole in our counter-terrorism strategy that control orders represent. On those grounds, I ask my right hon. and hon. Friends not to vote against these orders today, but I want to make it clear to the House that the consolidation and review of counter-terrorism legislation to be carried out by the probable next Administration will begin from the position that we will replace the present control order system. We will also seek to end the abuse of stop-and-search powers under terrorism legislation for non-terrorist-related incidents, and to address controversial offences relating to the distribution of literature and glorification. Perhaps most important of all, we will allow intercept to be used as evidence in our courts. Achieving that goal will enable us to deliver to public justice more of the people who seek to murder in pursuit of authoritarian theological and political goals in our open society. Such public justice should help to shake any complacency out of communities where our citizens are under direct threat of being suborned.